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Abstract:
Using geo-referenced data on development projects by the World Bank and China, we provide a
comprehensive analysis of the effect of aid on conflict using fixed effects and instrumental variables
strategies. The results show that aid projects seem to reduce rather than fuel conflict, on average.
Our analysis suggests that this is driven by projects in the transport and financial sectors, and
through less lethal violence by governments against civilians. There are no clear differences
based on ethnic fractionalization and government affiliation of a region, but some indications of
spill-overs to other regions. We also find no increased likelihood of demonstrations, strikes or
riots, but a higher likelihood of non-lethal government repression in areas where China is active.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
According to UNHCR, an unprecedented 65.3 million people are displaced from their homes by
war, internal conflicts, natural disasters or poverty. Africa is the continent most affected by this,
and while other African countries bear the majority of the burden, developed countries like those in
the European Union increasingly feel the impact of instability and conflict through migratory flows.
The common reaction to an increased inflow of refugees, besides tougher border controls, is to
call for more development aid to reduce poverty and conflicts as the root causes of displacement.
While the literature on aid converges towards a small, but mostly positive effect on development
outcomes (Dreher et al., 2018; Galiani et al., 2017; Clemens et al., 2011), other studies have
raised the question whether in some cases aid might actually fuel instead of pacify conflict (Nunn
and Qian, 2014; Child, 2018; Crost et al., 2014, 2016).
Nunn and Qian (2014), for instance, show that US food aid seems to lead to more conflict.
Berman et al. (2011) use subnational data to document that only specific types of development
projects succeed in reducing conflict in Iraq. Crost et al. (2014) and Crost et al. (2016) show that
development projects in the Philippines and Iraq can lead to an increase in conflict. Generally,
the existing literature on the relationship between aid and conflict is mostly focusing on the macro
country level (Bluhm et al., 2016; Nielsen et al., 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2014) or on specific types
of aid in individual countries (Berman et al., 2011; Child, 2018; Crost et al., 2016; Sexton, 2016).
Our paper aims to combine the strengths of these existing approaches. We consider a large set
of countries in Africa to draw broader implications, but use subnational geo-referenced data to link
aid projects and conflict events more precisely. In a situation where fragile, conflict-prone states
are described as the "new frontier of development" and many important donors, plan to increase
their activities in those countries, this seems a relevant question.1
We make three major contributions. First, we cover aid projects in a broad set of developing
countries in all of Africa and are able to assign projects locations to specific subnational admin-
istrative units (based on Strandow et al., 2011; Strange et al., 2017). This degree of precision in
our dataset allows us to flexibly control for a wide range of potentially distorting factors through
fixed effects, time trends, and observable region-specific factors. To further reduce endogeneity
concerns, we also propose an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that combines spatial variation
in the regions’ pre-determined likelihood to receive projects with donor-specific temporal variation
that is exogenous to conflict in individual regions.
Second, we consider two donors that represent contrasting types of projects and approaches
to development. The WB is a multilateral donor that emphasizes scientific expertise, frequently
imposes human-right and sustainability conditions, and aims not only at growth but also at social
1 See The Economist (2017), last accessed 14.06.2018.
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and political improvements in destination countries. China, in contrast, is not a member of the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and often portrayed as a "rogue" donor (Naím,
2007). It propagates a policy of "non-interference" in the internal affairs of recipient countries and
emphasizes economic "mutual benefits." In addition, Chinese economic targets such as securing
resource supply are a central part of their aid strategy. Many observers would expect that WB-like
aid is less likely to cause conflict, whereas Chinese engagement is often seen more critically and
accused of fueling conflict and repression (Raleigh et al., 2010). Being able to thus compare what
can be thought of as two extreme ends of the spectrum of aid policies strengthens the external
validity of our approach.
Third, we can distinguish between aid projects in various sectors, and between different conflict
types and the actors involved. In addition, we can exactly identify the regions within countries
where development projects are implemented, and contrast that with the locations where conflicts
take place. We match ethnic groups’ homelands with administrative regions and combine this with
data about the group’s status as belonging to the governing coalition or not. This allows us, for
instance, to measure whether more aid to regions controlled by the government increases the
likelihood of conflict in non-governing coalition regions. Combining spatial data on development
projects and conflict actors, thus, allows us to also better test specific mechanisms.
Using subnational data is, hence, not just a matter of more detail and precision, but opens
up the opportunity to better understand and distinguish between different theories. There are,
generally, two main mechanisms emphasized in the literature linking aid to conflict. On the one
hand, the opportunity cost hypothesis claims that higher resources and the associated revenues,
as well as higher incomes, make it less likely that people join rebel groups or engage in a conflict
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; McGuirk and Burke, 2017). On the other hand, resources may be
regarded as a price of winning control, and the contest (or rapacity) theory suggests that a higher
price sets an incentive to engage into combat (e.g., Grossman, 1992). Still, there are several other
possible channels besides these prominent main theories that we describe in more detail below.
To test for a potential effect of aid projects on conflict, we use georeferenced project level data
for the WB and China, available due to the efforts of various scholars (see Strandow et al., 2011;
Strange et al., 2017; Dreher et al., 2016) associated with AidData. With US$ 13.4 bn disbursed in
2014, the WB’s foreign aid arm – the International Development Association (IDA) – is arguably the
most important multilateral donor organization in the World (World Bank, 2017). At the same time,
China is also continually expanding its development and investment activities. Recently, the "One
Belt, One Road" initiative was prominently and controversially discussed, but China’s engagement
in Africa has already started to expand considerably in the late 1990s.
In order to establish causality, our identification strategy combines pre-determined cross-sectional
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variation interacted with a conditionally exogenous time series (as in Gehring and Lang, 2018 and
Lang, 2016). Similar to Nunn and Qian (2014) and Bluhm et al. (2018), we create this cross-
sectional variation by computing the probability that a region receives aid from a donor. Based on
Dreher et al. (2017), we use official information on the WB’s funding position and Chinese steel
(over-)production (World Steel Association, 2014) as temporal variation that is arguably exogenous
to conflict in individual region-years when conditioning on regional and country-year fixed effects.
The assumptions for this type of instrument are comparable to Bartik and shift-share instruments.
They essentially emulate a difference-in-difference approach in the first stage, where we compare
the effect of donors’ budget expansion on regions with differing pre-determined probabilities.
Our results provide several important insights. Most importantly, the OLS and IV specifications
provide no indication that aid fuels conflict on average. For the WB, a 10% increase in aid even
seems to reduce the likelihood of a conflict by up to two percentage points. This result becomes
insignificant when using an IV specification, however. More surprisingly, there is also no conflict
fueling relationship for Chinese aid on average. The point estimates are mostly negative, but close
to zero and in almost all cases statistically insignificant with OLS and IV.
Starting from these results, we then investigate heterogeneous effects and examine some hy-
potheses in more detail. Regarding projects in different sectors, we find a significant negative
relationship between projects in the finance sector (WB only), as well as in the transportation sec-
tor (WB and China). Aid in no sector is related to significantly more conflict. When considering
conflict actors, we find that both WB and Chinese engagement seems to lead to a reduction in
lethal violence by governments against civilians in the respective regions and years. We also find
no evidence of a conflict-fueling effect when considering different levels of aggregation, setting
a higher threshold of battle-related deaths for our conflict indicator, or when using the continu-
ous number of deaths instead. Additional specifications related to, among others, spill-overs, the
clustering of standard errors, and taking account of ethnic groups expand upon these main results.
Following the main results, we also examine types of conflicts that might remain overlooked
with our main outcome variable based on the number of battle-related deaths. Specifically, we
consider lower-level types of conflict like demonstrations, riots, and strikes, as well as repression
used by governments against the population (from the SCAD dataset). For both donors, we find no
positive effect on any of the first three measures. We do, however, find that an increased Chinese
engagement leads to an increase in non-lethal government repression.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature and outlines
proposed theories linking development finance to conflict. Section 3 explains the data and the
corresponding sources and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the specification
and empirical strategy. Section 5 shows and discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Existing Literature and theoretical considerations
2.1 Literature and theories
Many papers have linked development aid to conflict in different ways. The underlying theories,
if spelled out explicitly, however often make diverse and contradictory predictions. Generally, aid
can be considered as a type of windfall income shock, linking this literature to the larger research
field on (resource-related) income shocks and conflict (e.g., Berman et al., 2017; Berman and
Couttenier, 2015; Caselli et al., 2015; Morelli and Rohner, 2015). The literature then proposes two
main mechanisms on how aid affects conflict. The opportunity costs mechanism (e.g., Grossman
1991; McGuirk and Burke 2017) and the contest model (e.g., Hirshleifer 1989, 1995). The first
theory hypothesizes that with a rise in income the opportunity costs of fighting increase (McGuirk
and Burke, 2017), leading to less conflict on average. Similarly, if aid commitments are withdrawn,
e.g., negative aid shocks occur, recipient governments’ ability to make credible commitments is
weakened and citizens’ opportunity costs of engaging into conflict are reduced (Nielsen et al.,
2011; Strange et al., 2017). The contest model, or rapacity effect, in contrast, predicts that with
higher income the potential gains from fighting increase. This makes fighting more attractive, both
for groups as the payoff to "winning" control increases and for individuals, who are offered higher
wages for fighting in expectation of higher gains (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Considering aid
projects and conflict in the same unit of observation can reflect both those channels. This is the
main approach of our analysis, resembling Figure 1 a.).
As suggested above, the distributional dimension is important as conflict in many African coun-
tries is often best characterized as conflict between opposing groups and coalitions, less often
between individuals (Cederman et al., 2009). In many cases, existing tensions between ethnic
groups can be amplified or dampened by foreign aid projects. Still, the incentives can be very
different in regions controlled by the government or by ethnic groups that are part of the governing
coalition, than in other regions. To examine a potential contest effect, where groups "fight" for
the prize of holding the government, more accurately, we distinguish between different groups of
regions. More specifically, we distinguish between (i) regions controlled by the government, (ii)
those being composed of ethnic groups that are not part of the governing coalition, and (iii) mixed
or contested regions.
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a) b)
c) d)
Figure 1: Scenarios linking aid to conflict
Aid is usually controlled by the government and can help to undermine the political power of
opposing groups and increase support for the government (Beath et al., 2017). Crost et al. (2014)
suggest that rebel groups sabotaged a large community-driven development program in the Philip-
pines anticipating that it might be successful and weaken support for the rebels. Sexton (2016)
shows that aid is associated with increases in insurgent violence in contested districts. Figure 1
b.) shows an example of a specification focusing on regions, which are home to ethnic groups
with differing power status and, hence, more likely to be contested. Similarly, we can instead
also restrict our analysis to government-controlled regions, as Berman et al. (2013) postulate that
communities profit from aid projects only in areas controlled by the government.
Nonetheless, our data also allow us to distinguish more nuanced theories and test them em-
pirically. For instance, when considering development aid as a potential price for opposing groups,
this would not apply equally to all types of aid. We can distinguish between different aid types,
some of them with output that is hard to loot (e.g., a street or bridge) and others making looting
more likely (e.g., expensive health equipment in hospitals). The prior literature has also pointed
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towards an interesting incentive aid can set for recipient governments. In order not to lose aid, they
might be more reluctant to engage in conflict actions that appear unnecessary or overly violent to
reduce the risk of being shamed at the international stage (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009). We test
both hypotheses by considering aid flows specifically to the capital region or regions associated
with the governing coalition, and relating those to higher or lower conflict in other regions of the
same country (e.g., Figure 1 d.).
Another large strand of the literature revolves around equity questions of local revenues from
resources (Morelli and Rohner, 2015). In this regard, the importance of inter-group grievances is
stressed, which would particularly play a role in the ethnically diverse sub-Saharan African region
(Cederman et al., 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016; Østby, 2008). To explore this,
we test whether the relationship between development projects and conflict differs between highly
fractionalized and more homogeneous regions.
Moreover, intra-country spill-over effects are typically not considered. Aid payments in one
region might not fuel conflict in the region itself, but increase it in other regions. Again, existing
theories provide hypotheses about such a relationship that we can put to an empirical test. For
instance, other research emphasized that aid payments are largely fungible. This means that gov-
ernments that receive health aid might cut their own health expenditures, and use the free funds to
bolster military spending. Kishi and Raleigh (2015) suggest that if a country receives Chinese aid,
its military increases its violence against civilians (including bombing them).2 Moreover, the gov-
ernment might use developmental funds to increase its control over minorities’ homelands, which
could induce backlash effects by the "sons of the soil" (Fearon and Laitin, 2011). The same holds
for aid to regions controlled by rebel groups. A higher military capacity by one conflict party can be
used to attack regions controlled by rival groups or mixed regions that feature both government-
related and other groups. At the same time, a more capable military might make it less likely that
the respective other parties dare to attack (see a similar argument in Collier and Hoeffler (2007)).
The direction of the net effect is again theoretically unclear. Figure 1 c.) depicts this case for the
example of aid flowing mainly to non-coalition regions (and potential rebel groups) and measuring
conflict in regions that are part of the governing coalition. Figure 1 d.) depicts this case for the
example of aid flowing mainly to the capital and measuring conflict in regions outside the capital.3
Returning to the main theories, whether aid succeeds in raising average incomes and, thus,
increases opportunity costs is fiercely discussed in the aid effectiveness literature. The results
2 This is in line with Azam and Hoeffler (2002), who suggest that foreign funds might increase violence against
civilians. However, these predictions hold only for aid to war-affected countries, while we consider both peaceful and
contested regions.
3 Further work on the country level also stresses the context specificity of aid (e.g., resource endowments or institu-
tions) as well as its role for conflict dynamics (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Bluhm et al., 2016; Strange et al., 2017).
We leave those aspectsfor further research on the local level .
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converge towards a null on average (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009) or only small positive effects
(Galiani et al., 2017). This effect, however, depends on whether aid was politically motivated or
had a clear development focus (Dreher et al., 2018). Accordingly, whether and to what extent
aid projects raise income at the regional level is most likely quite heterogeneous, comprising both
negative and positive effects. In that regard, it is interesting to observe differences between China
and the WB. The WB is at least perceived by many to have a rather strong development focus.
When comparing the impact of aid projects to the gains from resource-related income shocks
(Berman et al., 2017; Gehring and Langlotz, 2018), it becomes clear that in both cases the dis-
tribution of gains is also important. Dube and Vargas (2013) show that in the case of Colombia,
higher resource prices lowered conflict if the resource was more labor-intensive. However, fueled
conflict if it was more capital intensive and the gains most likely accrued only to a small elite. Sim-
ilarly, there will be groups or people that profit from aid (the money must always go somewhere),
but whether these gains are used for short-term consumption, invested in fostering development
or ending up in the foreign bank accounts of government officials is unclear.
One aspect where aid differs from other shocks, prominently featured in the literature, is that
donors can to some extent impose which conditions and procedures need to be respected during
the implementation. Minasyan et al. (2017), for example, demonstrate the importance of donor
quality for aid effectiveness and Berman et al. (2013) hypothesize that projects are more success-
ful in reducing violence if they require the integration of development experts. Aid can also be
earmarked for certain projects or sectors, for instance generally for infrastructure or specifically
for building a particular school or hospital, which is a second conceptual difference compared to
other windfall income gains. Berman et al.’s (2011) analysis of development projects in Iraq, for
instance, suggests that only a small share and specific types of projects have a conflict-reducing
effect.
Considering donors that reflect the different ends of the distribution along those dimensions,
can crucially contribute to evaluating the effect of aid on conflict more systematically than the
existing literature. The next section explains shortly why the WB and China differ consistently with
regard to (i.) the use of conditionality, (ii.) the use of development expert knowledge, and (iii.) the
focus of their projects.
2.2 Two types of donors: China vs. the WB
The WB mostly reflects a model of conditional aid integrating expert knowledge with a clear focus
on development, whereas China specifically highlights non-interference, mutual economic bene-
fits, and room to maneuver for the recipient governments. This is visible along three dimensions.
First, conditionality is very common and used intensively by the WB. Projects often have a large
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variety of conditions attached ranging from human rights and democratic procedures to gender
equality. Second, the WB employs a large team of academics and country experts with the aim to
ensure that aid is spent effectively. Third, WB projects have a rather clear focus on development
and supporting particular democratic institutions and civil organizations. Although there is also
some political influence on WB decisions (Dreher et al., 2018), their projects are less politically
motivated than other types of aid (e.g., Dreher et al., 2009).
The WB’s aid arm provided 16.8% of funding of traditional Western donors between 1995 and
2012. This makes IDA the second largest donor after the EU institutions (18.7%) and before UN
agencies (6.4%) (OECD, 2017). As mentioned above, there are concrete plans to intensify and
scale-up its involvement in conflict-prone regions. For instance, the WB has spent up to 500 million
in the Central African Republic, approximately a third of its GDP, to prevent the fragile state from
sliding back into civil war. The Kecamatan Development program, which was directed by the WB in
cooperation with the Indonesian government, attempts to reduce conflict probability via a transpar-
ent and participatory approach (Gibson and Woolcock, 2005; Barron et al., 2011). Nevertheless,
WB projects have also been linked to increases in civil unrest and conflict. The construction of the
Pak Mun hydroelectric dam in the rural north-east of Thailand, for instance, sparked widespread
protests due to complaints that it displaced families, destroyed local fish stocks and wrecked irri-
gation systems.4
China, in contrast, is the most prominent example of an emerging "rogue" donor (Naím, 2007),
that is not a member of the OECD’s traditional Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It is
constantly expanding its activities in Africa, and during the 2000-2012 period, its official develop-
ment aid (ODA) commitments equaled 17.8% of US’ aid commitments (based on OECD, 2017;
Strange et al., 2017). When considering ODA and other official finance (OOF) activities USAID
and Chinese aid are en par.5 The latter country is often characterized as ignoring conditions
on human rights and good governance practices, in particular by the Western world and media.
One example is Ethiopia, where large energy projects allegedly ignored the needs and demands
of the local population. As another case in point, China’s president has visited and himself wel-
comed Zimbabwe’s former president Mugabe, contrasting efforts of Western donors to sanction
the country for electoral fraud and human rights abuses.6 At another instance, Uganda turned to
China to increase its engagement, after Western donors protested against strict "anti-gay" laws
in the country.7 Regarding conditions and focus, the Chinese perspective is to run a policy of
4 See The Economist, "Rural unrest," last accessed 14.06.2018.
5 Strange et al. (2017) as cited in Reuters, "New database focuses on China’s secretive aid to Africa," last accessed
08.10.2018.
6 Washington Post, "When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent," last accessed
26.07.2018.
7 See The Diplomat, "Uganda Looks to China," last accessed 26.07.2018.
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"non-interference" in the internal affairs of recipients, where projects are supposedly often directly
offered to state leaders and regimes focusing on economic "mutual benefit." 8 In this regard,
Dreher et al. (2016) find that Chinese projects in Africa are more likely to benefit the birth regions
of the respective leader, i.e., seem to be allocated less on a need-base. The implementation is in
most cases left to a larger degree to the respective partner governments, but at the same time,
some projects are reported to be mostly implemented by China and Chinese workers. Labor in-
tensity can crucially influence whether external shocks dampen or fuel conflict, as it is linked to
how evenly the gains are distributed (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Gehring and Langlotz, 2018)
In contrast, Western development projects have also been criticized for a lack of "ownership"
and missing use of local knowledge in recipient countries. Hence, the Chinese approach can have
an upside, which several African countries have also welcomed along with the larger focus on
developing common business interests.9
Empirically, Dreher et al. (2018) and Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2013) suggest that the degree
to which the Chinese government considers demand-side humanitarian and socioeconomic needs
is comparable to Western donors. Even though China puts less emphasis on strict human rights
conditions, China’s increasing focus on humanitarian issues becomes evident in its growing role
in UN peacekeeping missions over time and its official aim to "play a constructive role of settling
conflicts and hot issues and maintaining peace and security in Africa."10 What is more, with its ex-
panding activities and larger presence of Chinese employees in Africa, it also has a rising interest
in avoiding conflicts that threaten the value of its investments or the life of its citizens.
To sum up, when considering the mechanisms highlighted above, it becomes apparent that
almost all of them work at the subnational level, whereas most of the literature operates with
national level data. When aggregating both aid and conflict data at the national level most of the
postulated conflict theories are indistinguishable from each other. To analyze channels in more
detail with the help of subnational data, we differentiate between (i.) different types of aid, (ii.)
different actors, (iii.) regional attributes (e.g., fractionalization and power status), (iv.) different
spatial aggregations and (v.) spatial spill-overs. We will compare two donors. The WB with its
strong use of conditionality and expert knowledge, as well as its clear development focus should
theoretically have a low likelihood of leading to conflict. China, in contrast, is the donor that most
observers would deem much more likely to fuel conflicts due to the lack of human rights conditions,
more leeway for local politicians and a stronger focus on business interests.
8 David Shinn on Chinausfocus, "Africa Test’s China’s Non-interference Policy," last accessed 26.07.2018.
9 Anthony Germain on CBC, "China in Africa: No strings attached," last accessed 12.09.2018.
10 The Guardian, for instance, postulates that "Chinese aid to Africa is going to come with all sorts of strings attached,
despite the "no-conditionality" rhetoric." The Guardian: "The west has no right to criticise the China-Africa relation-
ship". Also reflected in saferworld.org.uk, "China’s growing role in African peace and security" and The Guardian,




Our unit of observation is the country-region-year, and the unit of analysis is the first level of
subnational administrative regions, henceforth ADM1 or regions (data from Hijmans et al., 2010).
The names of ADM1 regions vary by country but are commonly known as "provinces" or "states."
We choose this as the main unit over lower level administrative regions (ADM2), ethnic groups,
or grid-cells. Figure 2 shows that georeferenced projects alone, those that contain latitude and
longitude coordinates, comprise only less than 50% of overall projects. Taking projects assigned
to ADM2 and ADM1 regions also into account ensures that a reasonable share of total aid is
covered.11 For both China and the WB, this allows us to exploit variation covering over 90% of
the overall spending.12 Note that we capture a lower fraction of projects for China, but these are
mostly smaller projects. The first order administrative level is also highly relevant for aid allocation,
as many projects are assigned to specific regions, and the regional government can decide how
or where to spend the money, which is relevant for conflict outcomes.
Precisely georeferenced projects and projects where we possess information about the ADM2
regions are assigned to the respective ADM1 region. In most cases, projects also have several lo-
cations. When processing the project level data, we assume that aid is distributed equally across
locations and allocate aid proportionally to the locations per region, which is in line with previ-
ous research (Dreher and Lohmann, 2015). For instance, for a project with 10 locations, where
four locations are in region A and six locations are in region B, 40% of project volume would be
accounted in region A and 60% in region B.13
The data appendix provides more details. The remainder with less precise locations is mostly
non-geocoded aid accruing directly to the government, which we assign to the capital region in a
robustness test when considering potential spill-overs. We show results using the ADM2 regions
as a robustness test in the appendix, and incorporate ethnic group homelands by intersecting
those with the regions.
11 The WB officially releases information on its disbursements. In contrast, the only opportunity to compile information
on Chinese projects is the open source data collection on commitments. In line with Dreher et al. (2017), who show
that "project duration amounts to 664 days" on average, we take this into account by assuming a two year lag until
which Chinese aid projects would become effective.
12 Figure 6 provides a complimentary overview about the precision coding of locations.
13 Hence, our aid attribution formula is: Aidpijt = Aidpit´Locationspi ∗ Locationspj , where p is the project, i is the country,
j is the region and t is the period for which we estimate the allocation shares. For robustness, Tables A 51 and 50
also display the main results using population weights. For instance, if a project has project locations in two regions
of a country, and two million inhabitants reside in region A and three million in region B, 40% of project funds are
allocated to region A and 60% to region B. Here, the aid attribution formula is Aidpijt = Aidpit´ Populationpi ∗Populationpj .
Our population data build on the gridded population data provided by the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network (CIESIN) Columbia University (2016). As global population censuses have to build on strong
assumptions and yearly data have to be imputed, this is of course subject to a certain degree of measurement error.
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Figure 2: Disbursement/Commitment Amounts by Precision Codes
Table 1 shows a comparison of the two donors in some important dimensions. While informa-
tion for aid disbursements by WB’s IDA is available from 1995 to 2012, information on Chinese aid
commitments in Africa is constrained to the years 2000 to 2012.14 Over the sample period, the
WB still outspends China with USD 29.4 bn compared to USD 13.2 bn.15
Table 1: Donor Comparison: WB vs. China
WB Aid Chinese Aid
Total Disbursements/Commitments (USD): 29.4bn 13.2bn
Active in no. of Countries: 35 41
Number of projects: 1,472 333
Number of locations: 25,041 1,308
Mean number of locations per project 17 4
Mean per project (USD): 19.97m 39.63m
Mean per location (USD): 1.17m 10.09m
Notes: Aid is measured in constant 2011 USD.
Both are active in most African countries, 35 for the WB and 41 for China. They are, thus,
mostly active in the same set of countries (Humphrey and Michaelowa, 2018), which adds to the
comparability of donors. One interesting difference is that the WB finances a larger number of
projects which then also have more locations across countries on average. China finances fewer
but larger projects. Accordingly, China spends nearly twice as much per project and nearly ten
times as much per project location.
14 This analysis focuses on Official Development Aid (ODA) flows in contrast to other official finance (OOF). OOF also
plays a large role in China’s finance portfolio, but has a less development oriented focus. The WB also augments its
ODA with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which provides development finance
in the form of loans with interest rates closer to market rates. However, we expect a clearer relationship between
aid and conflict than with less concessionary development finance. One reason is that the domestic government’s
role in distributing concessionary development aid might increase the risk of distributive conflicts. Moreover, as
development finance is acquired on a loan basis, the respective government has to pay it back and, hence, has
larger incentives to invest it in a sustainable way.
15 The WB outspends China also for the shorter 2000 to 2012 period (USD 27.9 bn).
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We focus our analysis on the African continent and on countries with more than 1 million
inhabitants and include all countries, which were on the OECD’s DAC recipient list in the initial
year of 1995. The remaining sample comprises 728 ADM1 regions in 45 countries. Table 2
provides summary statistics of our most important analytical variables at the country-region-year
level. With regard to the main treatment variables WB and Chinese Aid, it becomes visible that
the WB provides higher levels of aid on average (e.g., USD 2.2 million versus USD 1.4 million
per region-year). However, the large standard deviation indicates that Chinese aid has a higher
degree of variation, with the maximum Chinese spending per region-year being USD 900 million;
nearly twice as large as the highest value for the WB. The high project values indicate China’s
large involvement in mega-projects to fund infrastructure including dams and power plants.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics - ADM1 Region
Mean SD Min Max
World Bank Aid (USD million) 2.240 8.992 0 488.643
ln(WB Aid) 6 9 -5 20
Chinese Aid (USD million) 1.391 22.843 0 900.000
ln(Chinese Aid) -4 4 -5 21
Battle Related Deaths 21 342 0 33,417
Conflict Incidence in Percent 12 32 0 100
Notes: Descriptive statistics for our main variables. ln(Aid) is based on aid
+0.01USD. The sample period is 1995-2012 for WB IDA and 2000-2012 for Chi-
nese Aid. For Chinese Aid 41 and for the WB Aid 35 recipients are considered
respectively.
3.1.1 WB Aid
The dataset from AidData (Strandow et al., 2011) about WB aid disbursements is comprehensive
both regarding time, ranging from 1995 to 2012, and regarding project scope. Geocoded dis-
bursements sum up to US$ 29.4 bn. distributed over 1,472 projects in 25,041 locations in Africa.
Additionally, AidData provides information on the sectoral allocation of disbursements, enabling us
to distinguish potentially differential effects of different aid types on conflict probability and intensity.
We focus on disbursements by the WB’s IDA, the WB’s arm for development aid.
3.1.2 Chinese Aid
Although China is perceived as a major political and economic actor, it was also a recipient of
sizeable amounts of development aid until recently. For instance, China only graduated from IDA in
1999 (Galiani et al., 2017). Since the 2000s, China has become a major donor itself and extended
its activities especially in Africa, and during the 2000-2012 period, its official development aid
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(ODA) and other official finance (OOF) activities were comparable to that of USAID (Strange et al.,
2017). However, China does not provide official disaggregated information on aid flows according
to the DAC standards. We build on the impressive data collection and geo-localization efforts by
Strange et al. (2017) and Dreher et al. (2016), associated with AidData. Those authors compile
data on Chinese ODA-like commitments for the years 2000-2012 based on a variety of sources,
mostly media reports. In total, these flows amount to USD 13.2 bn from 333 projects in 1308
locations.
3.2 Conflict measures
For our main specification, we rely on the number of battle-related deaths at the regional level
based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) georeferenced event dataset (GED) (Sund-
berg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). Derived from media and NGO reports,
as well as secondary sources (e.g., field reports or books), GED provides the most reliable and
comprehensive data on incidences of violence including the involved parties, casualties, and lo-
cation.16 Table 2 shows that the range of battle-related deaths per region-year varies between
0 and 33,417. The thresholds commonly used in the cross-country literature to identify conflict
are not applicable at the smaller regional level. A threshold of 1,000 casualties is too high, but
a minimum threshold of just one casualty would be too low and create too much measurement
error. Acknowledging the apparent trade-off, we chose 5 (low intensity) as the threshold for our
main specifications. We use 25 (medium intensity) as well as the log of battle-related deaths for
robustness tests. We use a similar measure from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD)
to evaluate smaller-scale conflict events like demonstrations, strikes or riots and non-lethal gov-
ernment repression (Salehyan et al., 2012).
We depict the geographical distribution of development aid locations for the WB and for China
in Figure 3a, as well as the number of experienced conflict years in Figure 3b. Visually examining
the overlap between average aid disbursements/commitments and conflict years in these maps is
not very informative, as they do not display the temporal order of events. Moreover, we cannot
distinguish selection into conflict-prone regions from an effect of aid, as well as account for par-
ticular regions being different in unobservable factors that cause them to be large aid recipients
and conflict-prone at the same time. Countries that had endured conflict in the past are also more
in need of post-conflict aid. WB’s IDA, for instance, disbursed 19% of its funds to regions re-
cently suffering from conflict, and China commits about 10% of its project volume to such regions.
16 An alternative would be the ACLED and PRIO Gridded datasets, which rely on similar primary data as UCDP. One
issue with PRIO Gridded data is that neighboring cells in a 50km radius are also coded as conflict-affected, which
might lead to erroneous conflict coding of neighboring administrative and ethnic regions (Tollefsen et al., 2012).




Figure 3: a.) Chinese (2000-2012) and WB (1995-2012) development aid. Authors’ depiction
based on AidData (2017) and Dreher et al. (2016).
Figure 3 b.) Conflict 1996-2014. Authors’ depiction based on Croicu and Sundberg (2015).
Category 1 (binary) = B+C, Category 2 (binary) = C, Category 3 (continuous) = {A, B, C}
Notes: Depicted borders refer to countries (thick line) and first administrative divisions (thin line).
Generally, conflict is widespread and often overlaps with the presence of the two donors. 52%
of the WB’s IDA resources and 31% of Chinese ODA-like finance are spent in regions that also
experience conflict at some point during our observation period.
Overall, there is a lot of variation in aid from both donors, as well as in conflict across and within
countries. This variation is crucial for our analysis, which distinguishes between two main types of
equations. In the first set, we condition on observables and unobservables through various fixed
effects and time trends. For instance, region-fixed effects eliminate within-country differences re-
lated to the likelihood of receiving aid and experiencing conflict, which gets lost when aggregating
at the national level. For example, Angola appears to receive relatively more aid projects in specific
regions, which at the same time experience more conflict. Of course, this is merely one correlation
that might be affected by unobserved region-specific factors that make both conflict and receiving
aid projects more likely. The second set goes one step further and uses country times year (from
now on country-year) fixed effects to rule out an effect of any spurious events at the country-year
level affecting conflict and by chance coinciding with changes in aid allocation (e.g., a change in
political regime).
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3.3 Control Variables
Besides our main variables of interest, we consider several other variables, which are suggested
in the literature as determinants of aid allocation or drivers of conflict. Regarding the targeting of
development aid, it is interesting to account for the initial regional development. GDP is proxied
using nighttime light, as subnational income estimates are scarce and of poor quality in low and
lower-middle income states (Henderson et al., 2012). Although lights already capture parts of
population density, as indicated by Henderson et al. (2017), we account for regional population
taken from the gridded population of the world dataset (Center for International Earth Science
Information Network (CIESIN) Columbia University, 2016). Population is both a relevant variable
in terms of aid allocation as well as in terms of a scale effect for conflict potential (Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006).
As a large literature stresses the potentially conflict-inducing effects of windfall gains related
to certain resources (e.g., Berman et al., 2017), we control for several natural resource indicators
including oil, gold, gemstones as well as narcotics. For this purpose, we use information from the
PRIO Gridded data (Tollefsen et al., 2012) and intersect them with the administrative boundaries.
This dataset also includes measures on temperature and precipitation, providing us with proxy
variables for local income shocks causing conflict (Miguel et al., 2004). To match the gridded
data to the respective regional units of observation, we intersect the PRIO-Grid with the countries’
regional dimension and calculate area-weighted averages for each region. Finally, we use data
from Cederman et al. (2014) and Wucherpfennig et al. (2011) to control for the distribution of ethnic
groups, which are often linked to conflict in the literature (Esteban et al., 2012; Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou, 2016).
4 Empirical strategy
Aid projects are not randomly allocated. This potential endogeneity of aid project allocation is the
concern when studying the relationship between development finance and conflict. Time-varying
omitted variables, like economic or political shocks at the regional level can affect both aid inflows
and conflict. Additionally, donors might tend to reduce or increase aid targeting to conflict-affected
regions depending on their allocation targets, raising issues of reverse causality. We pursue two
different empirical strategies. First, we use OLS regressions with varying sets of fixed effects, time
trends, and control variables, which allow a transparent examination of the underlying relationship
when exploiting different variation in the data. Our detailed subnational dataset exhibits enough
variation to allow the use of very restrictive sets of fixed effects and time trends that rule out many
concerns raised in the existing literature. Second, we will pursue IV strategies for both donors
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4.1 Linear models with fixed effects, time trends and control variables
Our baseline empirical specification is
Ci,c,t = Ai,c,t−1/t−2 + λc + τt + δi + λcT + λcT 2 +XExi,c,t + δiT +XEni,c,t−2 + κc,t + i,c,t, (1)
where Ci,c,t is our conflict indicator of interest in region i, in country c and year t. Ai,c,t−1/t−2
are the log of per capita aid disbursements/commitments. With regard to the timing, we consider
the WB disbursements from the previous year and follow the literature (Dreher et al., 2016, 2017)
in using a two year lag for Chinese commitment data.
We will add fixed effects, time trends, and control variables step by step to transparently show
how the relationship between conflict and aid changes when eliminating further variation. Fixed
effects include λc, τt, δi, which are country, time, and region fixed effects, respectively. Further-
more, we in a first step add country-specific linear λcT and quadratic time trends λcT 2, and later
also regional linear time trends δiT , which control for any differing linear conflict trends across
regions. Country-year fixed effects κc,t need to be considered carefully, as they eliminate many
potentially critical omitted variable problems, but also a lot of variation in the data. In essence,
including them asks a subtly different question: conditional on the whole country being in conflict
or not in a particular year, how have previous aid payments affected the likelihood of a particular
region to be in conflict. For that reason, we will always consider specifications with and without
country-year fixed effects.
Regarding control variables, we distinguish between three types of controls. First, controls
such as climatic shocks are exogenous and not affected by our treatment variable. Second, we
account flexibly for the effect of time-invariant controls like elevation or ruggedness by interacting
them with year dummies. These first two sets are contained inXExi,c,t, as they are not at risk of being
bad controls. Third, we lag potential "bad controls" like nighttime light (as a proxy for economic
activity) or population, which can be affected directly by aid projects, by two periods. Using "pre-
determined" values solves the bad control issue if we assume sequential exogeneity. This might
be a strong assumption, which is why we show specifications including XEni,c,t−2, but do not include
those variables in our baseline equations. The error term is denoted as ir,t.
We cluster standard errors at the country-year and regional level (Cameron et al., 2011). This
allows for arbitrary correlation within a country and year, which is important as conflicts often have
a strong spatial component and tend to spill-over. Also allowing for correlation within a region over
time is important as conflict also tends to exhibit strong persistence over time. Other potential
clustering options are shown in Tables A 49 and 48.
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4.2 Instrumental Variable approach
Our IV strategies exploit the heterogenous impact of a plausibly exogenous time-series interacted
with a (pre-determined or fixed) cross-sectional difference.17 The identifying assumption is that in
absence of a change in the time series there would be common trends in aid allocation in low and
high aid probability recipient regions. As in any Difference-in-Difference (DiD) setup, the first and
second stage control for the main constituting terms forming the interaction and only the interaction
term is used as the conditionally exogenous instrument. For both the WB and China, we use a
cumulative (initial or pre-determined) probability over the whole sample period. This is computed
by dividing the number of years a region i had received aid in the past by the number of years
passed until period t.18 Beyond the donor-specific probability, identification strategies for the WB
aid and Chinese Aid, hence, differ only in the time-varying factor Tt used to induce variation in
project allocations over time.
4.2.1 Instrumenting WB Aid
For the WB, we use exogenous yearly variation in the availability of free IDA resources. This
funding position is defined as "the extent to which IDA can commit to new financing of loans,
grants, and guarantees given its financial position at any point in time" (World Bank, 2015).19
Starting in 2008, we use the measure publicly disclosed in the annual financial reports. From
1995 to 2008 we rely on the reconstructed time series by Dreher et al. (2017). Thus, the first
stage equation has the following form:
Aidi,c,t−1 = α1pi,c,t−2 + α2IDAt−1 + α3pi,c,t−2IDAt−1 + i,c,t−1 (2)
Figure 4 shows the fluctuations in the indicator. The variation can be caused by internal adjust-
ments, the timing of payments by the shareholders, as well as repayments by large borrowers like
India. Conflict in any individual African region cannot plausibly affect the measure to a significant
degree. Overall, there is a downward trend, partly caused by some major shareholders failing to
17 This builds on Nunn and Qian (2014), who exploit temporal variation in US wheat production, which they then
interact with the aid recipient’s probability to receive US food aid. In essence, this strategy is similar to Bartik
instruments used, e.g., in the labor economics literature (Autor et al., 2013) or the shift-share instruments common
in the migration literature (Altonji and Card, 1991). In contrast to most Bartik and shift-share instruments, where
cross-sectional units differ in many dimensions, e.g., different industry shares or immigrant enclave sizes, the units
in our approach differ only along one dimension, the probability to receive aid.
18 If our sample begins in 1995, and a region received aid in three out of five years, the value of the probability in
1999 would be 0.6. If aid receipts stop in 1999, the probability would decline to 0.5 in 2000 as the country would
have received aid in three out of six years. The constant probability used in Nunn and Qian (2014) or Bluhm et al.
(2018) relies on all observed treatment values per unit, i.e., the term for region i in year t also depends on the
values in t + 1, t + 2, .... These future values can themselves be a function of conflict. Nizalova and Murtazashvili
(2016) show that under certain assumptions the interaction of an exogenous variable with an endogenous variable
can be interpreted as exogenous when controlling for the endogenous factor (in this case the constant probability).
Nonetheless, using initial or pre-determined values minimizes endogeneity concerns.
19 The idea is based on Lang (2016) and Gehring and Lang (2018), who employ such a supply-push identification
approach using variation in the IMF’s liquidity.
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deliver on payments promised before. However, despite the general decline, the indicator also
fluctuates strongly between the years. For instance, it initially increases between 1996 and 1997,
before it falls sharply in the following years.
We then interact this time-varying variable with pi,c,t, the probability of a region receiving aid.
Regions with a higher likelihood to receive aid in the past seem to profit more if there are additional
funds available.20 Thus, we expect a positive interaction term in the first stage.21
4.2.2 Instrumenting Chinese Aid
There is no exact equivalent to the IDA’s funding position for Chinese aid. Instead, Ti,c,t is a time
series on production in the country’s over-sized steel sector (World Steel Association, 2009, 2014).
The production level was shown to affect the overall amount of Chinese aid as China would com-
mit to more aid projects to clear markets and protect domestic companies from potential losses
(Dreher et al., 2016). These projects are often large-scale infrastructure projects (Bräutigam,
2011), but Bluhm et al. (2018) show that steel production also induces variation in other sectors
(social, education or health) beyond roads and railways. China is also generally known as engag-
ing in "mega-deals" (Strange et al., 2017), which are generally larger than WB projects. Thus,
the local average treatment effect based on the variation induced by the IV is rather representa-
tive of China’s aid activities. The time series itself is hardly influenced by any individual region in
Africa, and we control for the main effect in the second stage. Our instrument is, as for the WB,
the interaction with the region-specific prior (or initial) cumulative probability to receive Chinese
aid. Based on the existing literature, We expect that (over-)production benefits regions with a low
prior probability more, as China apparently expands its activities to new regions. The first stage
equation for Chinese aid has the following form:
Aidi,c,t−2 = α1pi,c,t−3 + α2Steelt−3 + α3pi,c,t−3Steelt−3 + i,c,t−2 (3)
One potential issue is a long-term upward trend in Chinese steel (over-)production and the fact
that there is less year-on-year variation than in the WB funding position. This linear trend increases
the risk of picking up trends in other variables that differ between high and low probability regions
and overlap with the conflict trends, one of the concerns raised by Christian and Barrett (2017).
For that reason, we de-trend the time series for our main specification. We show results without
de-trending in a robustness test; in practice, this transformation makes little difference.
20 This was confirmed in informal talks with WB and recipient country staff.
21 Because the WB’s fiscal year ends in June, the reported position in the fiscal years t and t-1 can both affects
disbursements in t-1. Using only the position in t-1 is a viable alternative and also works well in first stage estimations,
which is demonstrated in Table A20. Using both fiscal years t and t-1 to compute the funding position appears more
coherent and is applied subsequently.
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4.2.3 Examining the first stages
(a) Mean BRD: Problematic trends (b) Mean BRD: Actual trends
Figure 4: WB: IDA funding position and Battle-Related Deaths for low and high probability regions.
Note: Figure 4 (a) displays the running average of the IDA Funding Position (thick line), fabricated trends in the mean
battle-related deaths per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and in the mean battle-related deaths per high
probability recipient regions (dashed line). Figure 4 (b) displays the IDA Funding Position (thick line), the mean residual
of the battle-related deaths per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean residual of the battle-related
deaths per high probability recipient regions (dashed line). The residuals refer to the underlying variation used in our
preferred specification from column (4) in Table 3.
In order to illustrate potentially problematic variation causing biased estimates of aid on conflict
as suggested by Christian and Barrett (2017), the left-hand side of Figures 4 and 5 shows the time
series that we use, along with manually fabricated trends in conflict in low and high probability
regions. This illustrates a potentially problematic case as the trends for high probability regions
overlap with the long-term trends of the IDA funding position or the detrended steel production.
On the right-hand side, we show the actual residual variation net of fixed effects and time trends
in the outcome and the instrumental variables that we exploit in our estimations. There is no clear
overlap between long-term trends in the time series variables and outcomes in either low or high
probability regions, in particular when considering the residual variation used in our subsequent
analysis.22
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) describe the potential risks and caveats of similar IV strate-
gies and highlighted the importance of considering differences in the cross-sectional units and
emphasize the need to consider whether the first stage is driven by only a few observations or out-
liers. Christian and Barrett (2017) emphasize potential problems with trends that differ between
high and low probability countries (regions) both in the treatment and in the outcome variable. The
various robustness tests we explain below suggest no such problem, but we also highlight that we
regard the IV approach as complementary to the more transparent OLS specifications.
22 To allow the reader to assess the trends in the treatment variables, Figure A 13 depicts the time series for the means
of logged WB and Chinese aid per high and low exposure regions.
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(a) Mean BRD: Problematic trends (b) Mean BRD: Actual trends
Figure 5: China: Deviations from trend in Chinese steel production and Battle-Related Deaths for
low and high probability regions.
Notes: Figure 5 (a) displays the log of the detrended Chinese Steel Production (thick line), fabricated trends in the
mean battle-related deaths per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and in the mean battle-related deaths per
high probability recipient regions (dashed line). Figure 5 (b) displays the log of Chinese Steel Production (thick line),
the mean residual of the battle-related deaths per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean residual
of the battle-related deaths per high probability recipient regions (dashed line). The residuals refer to the underlying
variation used in our preferred specification from column (4) in Table 3.
5 Results
5.1 OLS, fixed effects and time trends
Ruling out potential sources of omitted variables bias in cross-country studies through fixed effects
and time trends comes at the costs of losing useful variation. Even though we normally try to
minimize false discoveries, a plausible prior in our case is to assume that aid fuels conflict (e.g.,
based on studies like Nunn and Qian, 2014 and Crost et al., 2014). Thus, focusing on conservative
specifications which eliminate much variation creates the risk of over-looking such an effect. To
allow readers to evaluate the trade-off for themselves, we begin by showing simple correlations
and then step-by-step add fixed effects, time trends and different categories of control variables.23
Beginning with WB aid in Table 3, we find that the raw correlation with conflict incidence is
negative. The coefficient of -0.19 suggests that 10% more WB aid is correlated with a conflict
likelihood that is about 1.9 percentage points lower. Adding country and year fixed effects shift
the coefficient upward (column 2), adding country-specific linear and quadratic trends to capture
country-specific conflict dynamics moves it again slightly downward to -0.05 (column 3). When
adding region fixed effects, which capture region-specific time-invariant attributes that can explain
23 A second trade-off is between showing both donors over the same period. The advantage is that it would increase
comparability. The disadvantage is that we would lose five years for the WB (1996-2001). Moreover, when doing this
for IV specifications the F-statistics for the WB are much smaller, giving rise to potential weak instrument concerns.
Hence, we exploit the full range of available data for the main specification, and show the results for both donors
combined in Table A54 with OLS and in Table A52 with IV.
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heterogeneity within countries, the point estimates nearly quadruple in size (-0.21) and become
statistically significant at the 1%-level (column 4).
Adding exogenous controls and time-invariant region characteristics, interacted with year dum-
mies to capture their potentially time-varying influence (column 5), as well as adding region-
specific linear time trends changes the coefficient only slightly (column 6). Column 8 goes one
step further by controlling for country-year fixed effects. The remaining variation is then only due
to differences in aid across regions within country-years, conditional on the country as a whole
being in conflict or not. Despite the strict specification, the robust negative relationship between
WB aid and conflict does not disappear and remains significant at the 5%-level. It becomes in-
significant when controlling for lagged values of factors that are potentially endogenous controls
(columns 7 and 9), but remains negative. Although these are only conditional correlations, the fact
that 8 out of 9 coefficients are negative suggests that there is no conflict-fueling effect of WB aid
on average.
Turning to China, our prior is that a positive relationship with conflict is more likely. Chinese
aid is by some observers deemed as "rogue aid," which promotes authoritarian and violent elites
and leaders. Nonetheless, the raw correlation with conflict is also negative. The coefficient drops
drastically in size when adding country and time fixed effects, as well as country-specific quadratic
time trends (columns 2 and 3), but loses significance. Overall, the coefficients are much smaller
and closer to zero than for the WB. Remarkably, however, there is not a single positive coefficient,
also suggesting no signs of a conflict-inducing effect of Chinese aid. Our preferred specifications in
columns 6 and 8 indicate that 10% more Chinese aid corresponds with a 0.65 and 0.35 percentage
points decrease in conflict incidence.
These results need to be put into perspective. Table 3 reveals that researches have many de-
grees of freedom, especially at the subnational level. What we find reassuring is that throughout
all these different specifications there is no sign of a conflict-inducing effect for either WB or Chi-
nese development finance projects. Relating to the ideas in Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2018),
we also see that the effect of adding additional FE, trends, and covariates neither suggests a clear
upward nor a downward bias. Certainly, a zero, as well as negative effects, could be a part of the
true confidence interval. Still, it seems unlikely that unobserved factors would push the average
effect towards a positive and significant coefficient. We continue examining a potentially remaining








Table 3: OLS results: Aid and conflict at the ADM1 level
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1918∗ 0.0010 -0.0496 -0.2129∗∗∗ -0.2057∗∗∗ -0.1608∗∗ -0.0419 -0.1772∗∗ -0.1420
(0.0989) (0.0776) (0.0683) (0.0659) (0.0701) (0.0782) (0.0849) (0.0847) (0.1048)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.1753∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0026 -0.1090∗ -0.0663 -0.0654 -0.0641 -0.0347 -0.0369
(0.0865) (0.0705) (0.0642) (0.0572) (0.0783) (0.0827) (0.0877) (0.1015) (0.0916)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the
WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.2 IV
Table 4 shows the IV results for our preferred specifications. The first stages for both donors work
well. The interaction term between the prior probability to receive aid and the IDA position (Chinese
steel, respectively) is highly significant in both specifications, with and without country-year fixed
effects. On average, the first stage works better for the WB (F= 99/86) than for China (F=22/16),
but all F-statistics are well above the critical value of 10. In addition to being relevant, the signs
of the coefficients are also plausible. Regions with a higher initial probability profit more from a
higher WB liquidity. Table A15 and A16 illustrate that the mechanism seems to work through both
the extensive and intensive margin. High probability regions receive more projects, but the size of
projects also increases. China shows a reverse pattern. In years where excess steel production
is higher, China expands its activities with new projects in regions with an initially lower likelihood
of receiving a project.
The second stage results largely confirm the OLS results. Both specifications yield a negative
coefficient for the WB and China. The coefficients for the WB are somehow smaller (larger) in the
specification without (with) country-year FE, and become statistically insignificant. The coefficients
for China become much more negative but remain insignificant. There is again no evidence for
a conflict-fueling effect of aid projects. This is noteworthy, as despite estimating a rich set of
specifications, we could not find for any of the two extremely different donors an average effect,
which would link aid to conflict.
Examining those results with more scrutiny raises the question to what degree they represent
a local average treatment effect (LATE) that might be different from the average effect. By def-
inition, the IV estimate is identified using a particular kind of variation in the variable of interest.
Nonetheless, comparing the IV point estimates with OLS shows some differences in size but no
difference with regard to the direction of the effects.
We can check whether the direction of the changes when moving from OLS to IV estimations
is plausible by running OLS specifications using leads and lags of our variable of interest (Table
A14). More specifically, we include three lags, the contemporaneous value, and a lead term. For
the WB, there are no clear indications of a pre-trend that would signal selection bias. For China,
however, the lead terms are positive in both cases. This indicates that China selects regions that
are more likely to experience a conflict in the following years. Maybe this is due to China being
less worried about violent regimes, or attempts to fill up the space left by other donors who are
more hesitant to enter that type of region.24 This suggests an upward bias in the OLS coefficients,
which is in line with the IV coefficients for China being more negative. For the WB, without apparent
24 In this regard, Strange et al. (2017) demonstrate that after withdrawal of Western aid Chinese commitments fill gaps
and, hence, can reduce conflict risk.
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pre-trends, IV and OLS results are very similar.
Despite signaling a null or slightly negative effect on average, the rather large standard errors
suggest that this average effect hides considerable heterogeneity. Thus, we continue by examining
different types of aid, the actors involved in conflict, and potential heterogeneity related to ethnic
fractionalization and governing coalition membership.
Table 4: IV results: Aid and conflict at the ADM1 level
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1014 -0.2252
(0.3752) (0.4192)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.4509 -0.4276
(0.6168) (0.8068)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8763∗∗∗ -60.6567∗∗∗
(14.9526) (14.9524)
N 7975 7975
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include exogenous (time-varying) controls. Year and
region fixed effects as well as time trends are included in all regressions. Time Trends include
linear and squared country-specific time trends and a linear regional trend. The constituent term
of the probability is depicted in Table A17. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5.3 Channels - Aid Subtypes
Theoretically, different types of aid should be more or less likely to fuel or calm down a conflict.
Investments in education and communication infrastructure are often highlighted as those with
particularly high long-term benefits, but most likely also require more time to have an effect. To
the extent that projects in particular areas stimulate economic development in the short run, we
would expect that they increase the opportunity costs of fighting and could, thus, lead to less
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conflict. At the same time, some development projects like hospitals, and to lesser extent schools,
provide more potential for looting due to, for instance, expensive machines that can be sold on the
black market. Other areas, like infrastructure projects, are notoriously known for being prone to
corruption.
We assign aid projects to eight subcategories and consider them as a treatment in our two
favorite specifications with and without country-year FE. For the WB, the IV strategy works well,
using sector-specific probabilities. For China, the IV does not work sufficiently well, because
there are only a few observations in some sectors. Thus, we show those results using OLS.
Interesting differences emerge, suggesting that different types of aid indeed can have a different
relationship to subsequent conflict. Note that in almost all cases, the country-year FE only affect
the coefficients’ sizes, not their signs.
In some categories, there is a positive coefficient of WB (Chinese) aid, but it never becomes
statistically significant. Based on significance, the negative coefficient we found for the WB seems
to be driven by projects in the area "finance" and "transportation" on average. Those coefficients
remain significant both in the less and more restrictive specification with country-year FE. In the
latter specification, a 10% increase in WB spending on transportation (finance) is related to a 6.7
(16) percentage points reduction in the likelihood of conflict. Transportation comprises both a large
scope of projects and funds, compared to financial development, which is rather small in terms
of dollars spent. Despite the limited amount of disbursements, the financial sector is important
and comprises overall 1,361 projects. The negative effect for transportation, often infrastructure
projects, is particularly interesting when considering the potential for corruption and cronyism in
this sector. It suggests that existing constraints on movement or high transportation costs were a
significant obstacle for development before.25 Moreover, transportation is the only sector where
we consistently find negative and significant effects on conflict likelihood for both the WB and
China.
Putting these sector-specific results into perspective, Table 5 suggests heterogeneities across
aid categories which help to explain the large confidence interval when estimating the mostly
negative coefficient on overall aid. It is important to note that we find no significant conflict-fueling
effect for any type of aid and any of the two donors. It is reassuring that the overall negative
relationship is not masking strong conflict-fueling effects in some sectors.26
25 The high conflict reducing effect of aid in the "transportation" sector also corresponds to other related studies, which
indicate the salience of transport costs for economic growth across African countries (Berman and Couttenier, 2015;
Storeygard, 2016; Bluhm et al., 2018)
26 Table A47 presents the regressions for the WB with OLS and China with IV. The OLS results differ in some cases,








Table 5: ADM1 - Aid Subtypes
WB Aid Subtypes - IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.2179 -0.2102 0.3423 0.5525 -1.6744∗∗ 0.2773 -0.1658 -0.7843∗∗ 0.5021 -0.4463
(0.3572) (0.4195) (0.3016) (0.4572) (0.7877) (0.4321) (0.2858) (0.3323) (0.5593) (0.3647)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 58.309 80.342 39.353 50.568 16.781 73.307 33.666 64.555 40.026 31.887
Panel B: Country-Year FE
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.4793 -0.4087 0.2652 0.2253 -1.5963∗ 0.2952 -0.1206 -0.6667∗ -0.2726 -0.3717
(0.3152) (0.4445) (0.2709) (0.4771) (0.9361) (0.4020) (0.2764) (0.3570) (0.6850) (0.3299)
N 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 59.949 61.188 56.632 31.111 12.238 73.686 36.219 28.587 23.180 33.957
Chinese Aid Subtypes - OLS
Panel C: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.3165 -0.2123 0.1770 -0.0830 N.A. -0.0168 0.3516 -0.2780∗ -0.2974 0.8388
(0.2007) (0.1391) (0.1325) (0.1637) (N.A.) (0.1448) (0.2661) (0.1611) (0.1935) (0.8093)
Panel D: Country-Year FE
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.1946 -0.1881 0.1281 -0.0484 N.A. 0.0287 0.3241 -0.3378∗ 0.0377 0.7787
(0.2239) (0.1434) (0.1329) (0.1703) (N.A.) (0.1561) (0.2848) (0.2018) (0.2138) (0.7893)
N 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012
for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Regressions account for (time-varying) exogenous controls
and time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as a linear regional trend. AX - "Agriculture, fishing, and forestry" BX - "Public Administration, Law, and
Justice" CX - "Information and communications" EX - "Education" FX - "Finance" JX - "Health and other social services" LX - "Energy and mining" TX - "Transportation" WX - "Water, sanitation and
flood protection" YX - "Industry and Trade" Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5 RESULTS 27
5.4 Actors
Many claims about a conflict-fueling or alleviating effect make implicit assumptions about involved
actors. For donors, it is a crucial difference whether the government is fighting against rebel
groups, rebel groups are fighting each other, or uninvolved third parties (i.e., civilians) are attacked.
War actions against rebel groups might be accepted or even encouraged by donors. In contrast,
attacks on civilians are often condemned by donors, even if happening during an existing conflict,
and might be a reason to withhold aid or reduce future payments.27 We can distinguish between
state- and rebel violence, and actions by those two groups against civilians not directly involved in
the conflict. The UCDP Codebook describes one-sided violence as "[...] the use of armed force by
the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians [...]" (Eck and Hultman,
2007).
Table 25 shows the results for both the WB and China with and without country-year FE. State-
based violence decreases with additional WB aid but increases with additional Chinese aid. The
coefficients are not statistically significant but of an economically meaningful magnitude. Both for
the WB and China, we find positive coefficients on violence by actors like rebel groups, which are
larger for China but never statistically significant. The picture looks very different when considering
violence against civilians. In a region that receives either more WB or Chinese aid, there are fewer
attacks and assaults that kill civilians. This holds for both violence by non-government and state
actors, but the effect is more nuanced for state violence. 10% more WB aid leads to a between 3.6
and 2.9 percentage points lower likelihood of lethal violence against civilians (columns 5 and 6),
and 10% more Chinese aid even to a between 7.9 and 8.9 percentage points reduction (columns
5 and 6). Both coefficients are remarkably stable to the addition of country-year fixed effects,
suggesting that this effect is not driven by unobservable time-varying factors at the country level.
Even within a country that is already in conflict, administrative regions with aid projects are less
likely to experience violence against civilians.
A plausible and underappreciated channel is the threat of losing out on future payments and
projects (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009). Even for recipient politicians that are not solely concerned
with public goods, the withdrawal of aid can be a viable threat to regions or governments. This
conflict-reducing effect is even stronger for Chinese projects. Even without officially imposing con-
ditions about human rights violations, governments in Africa seem to abstain from lethal actions
against civilians when China supports a project in a particular region. Besides business inter-
ests, the presence of Chinese workers might be another reason to lobby recipient governments to
abstain from engaging in actions that could cause severe conflicts.
27 Analogously donors might also accept or encourage rebels to fight an opposed regime as in the case of covert aid
to Angolan UNITA under president Reagan (Lagon, 1992). Our data cover almost exclusively projects implemented








Table 6: ADM1 - Actors (clustering at country-year and regional level)
Panel A: WB Aid - IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV: IDA Position - Actors State vs N-State N-State vs N-State State vs Civilans N-State vs Civilians
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.4177 -0.4319 0.1252 0.1488 -0.3579∗ -0.2939∗ -0.0961 -0.1417
(0.3174) (0.2630) (0.2096) (0.2447) (0.1885) (0.1739) (0.2072) (0.2704)
N 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid - IV
IV: Chinese Steel - Actors State vs N-State N-State vs N-State State vs Civilans N-State vs Civilians
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.4519 0.4148 0.3811 0.5800 -0.7980∗∗ -0.8882∗ -0.3983 -0.4488
(0.2851) (0.3421) (0.2967) (0.4270) (0.3463) (0.4776) (0.3361) (0.4218)
N 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456 22.468 16.456 22.468 16.456 22.468 16.456
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure.
Exogenous (time-varying) controls are included in all regressions. Time Trends included, consist of linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear
regional time trends. "State vs N-State" refers to state-based violence against non-government actors, "N-State vs N-State" refers to non-government violence against the
other organized non-state groups, and "State vs Civilians" refers to one-sided violence versus civilians by the government and "N-State vs. Civilians" refers to one-sided
violence versus civilians by non-government (NG) actors. The categories are mutually exclusive. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.5 Types of Violence
Kishi and Raleigh emphasize "dire consequences" of Chinese aid, and state that "political violence
rates involving state forces also increase" (Raleigh et al., 2010). Should we conclude that these
fears are unwarranted? Not necessarily. Our analysis has focused on violent conflict that involves
battle-related deaths, but the authors highlight that states "use this aid to finance their hold on
power by repressing political competitors." It seems plausible that China is interested to avoid
outright battles, but using government repression to ensure stability is in line with its domestic ap-
proach and ideology. In that regard, some observers claim that Chinese aid purposefully supports
building up recipient countries’ surveillance capacities to repress elements of civil society.28
To evaluate this hypothesis, we rely on the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Sale-
hyan et al., 2012). The particular strength of this database is that it covers types of social and
political disorder that are usually overlooked in other conflict datasets, with georeferenced data
available from 1990-2016. We are in particular interested in two types of variables. We code bi-
nary variables that take on the value one if there was at least one riot, strike, or demonstration in a
district to measure potential civil unrest or protests against projects related to China. Second, we
code whether there was at least one event recorded as repression by the government, focusing
on non-lethal repression to distinguish these regressions from our prior results.
Table 7 begins with regressions running our two main specifications, but now replacing the
outcome variable with an indicator measuring whether at least one demonstration, riot, or strike
took place.29 For the WB, all specifications yield a negative or very small positive coefficient but
remain statistically insignificant. Regarding China, we observe positive coefficients for demonstra-
tions and riots, but although they are rather large (10% more aid increase the likelihood of riots
by 5.3%) they remain statistically insignificant. Accordingly, despite reports indicating increasing
protests against Chinese projects, we find no clear evidence of this over our sample period.30
Recipient governments might achieve this absence of protests and outright conflict by inten-
sifying non-lethal repression. Table 8 tests whether more reports relate non-lethal government
repression to aid. The results indicate neither a positive nor significantly negative relationship for
the WB. The results for China contrast our prior findings and confirm that repression intensifies
in regions where China is present. A 10% increase in Chinese aid increases the likelihood of
experiencing repression by about 13%.31
28 Washington Post, last accessed 26.07.2018.
29 Table 26 depicts corresponding OLS results. Tables A28, 29 and 30 show OLS regressions separately for demon-
strations, riots and strikes.
30 See, for instance, The Telegraph, last accessed 09.10.2018.
31 Table 32 reports results for a count variable of non-lethal pro-government violence events, which are robust to this
change in the outcome variable. Table 31 verifies that this is driven by events recorded in SCAD that are distinct from
the UCDP events, by coding only those region-years as a one that did not experience lethal government violence








Table 7: ADM1 IV (Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD])
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
Demonstr. Demonstr. Riots Riots Strikes Strikes
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.2232 -0.1458 0.0106 -0.1950 0.0289 -0.0184
(0.2514) (0.2808) (0.2543) (0.2294) (0.1793) (0.1463)
N 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second stage: Chinese Steel
Demonstr. Demonstr. Riots Riots Strikes Strikes
ln(Chinese Aid t-1) 0.1891 0.2717 0.1300 0.1922 -0.1806 -0.1203
(0.5720) (0.6863) (0.5144) (0.6737) (0.5557) (0.7172)
N 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456 22.468 16.456 22.468 16.456
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for any violence of these three types as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB
and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. OLS results are depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Non-lethal pro-government Violence [SCAD]
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.1543 0.0885
(0.1042) (0.1177)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-1) 0.9798∗∗∗ 1.3059∗∗∗
(0.3663) (0.5025)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a binary indicator of non-lethal pro-
government violence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clus-
tered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the
sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5.6 Spatial spill-overs
Moving beyond studying aid and conflict in the same region we account for potential spatial spill-
over effects. This is important for two reasons. First, some existing theories can only be tested
by considering the effect of aid in location i on conflict in a particular location j. The "price" theory
postulating government as a price for rebels would predict that more aid to capital regions or the
capital itself leads to a higher likelihood of conflict in that location. Other theories, however, predict
that aid payments to one region affect the likelihood of conflict in another region. Kishi and Raleigh
(2015) suggest that as aid is fungible, governments can shift expenditures towards strengthening
their military. Improved military forces could then be used to strike down on rebel groups and other
areas of the country.
In line with our prior results, aid projects to outsider regions might strengthen those regions and
reduce conflict there but also enable rebel groups to contest the government and attack regions
that belong to the governing coalition. To test this, we code binary variables indicating (i) whether
a region is the capital region or not, and (ii) whether a region features only groups that are part of
the governing coalition, has no coalition groups or is mixed. Second, even if actors are similarly
concerned about losing aid revenues, we would expect that fighting continues in other regions if
underlying tensions are not resolved.
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For these tests, we proceed in the following way. Within each country and year, we aggregate
all aid projects and conflicts at the categorical level of these variables. For instance, we aggregate
the overall amount of aid spent in regions (A) that belong to a country’s governing coalition, and
the overall amount spent in all other regions (B). We apply the same procedure to get an aggregate
of the conflict incidence variable. In the following, we then test whether aid receipts in area A lead
to a higher likelihood of conflict in A but also in area B. Table 9 presents the results using OLS
regressions and clustering standard errors at the country level.
Table 9: Spill-Overs from coalition to non-coalition regions - OLS
Panel A: World Bank
Conflict in region belonging to... Non-Coalition Coalition Mixed
ln(WB Aid non-coalition t-1) -1.7092∗∗∗ 0.4046∗∗ -0.0432
(0.5116) (0.1942) (0.4648)
ln(WB Aid coalition t-1) 1.3437∗∗ -1.4479∗∗∗ -0.0482
(0.5493) (0.3317) (0.6200)
ln(WB Aid mixed t-1) -0.6811 0.6578∗∗ 0.1513
(0.4946) (0.2806) (0.6715)
N 703 703 703
Panel B: China
Conflict in region belonging to... Non-Coalition Coalition Mixed
ln(Chinese Aid non-coalition t-2) -0.2931 -0.2897 -0.8032∗∗∗
(0.4996) (0.3274) (0.2367)
ln(Chinese Aid coalition t-2) -0.1080 -0.1373 -0.1501
(0.1816) (0.1482) (0.1673)
ln(Chinese Aid mixed t-2) 0.2577 -0.0313 0.1550
(0.3071) (0.1773) (0.2523)
N 666 666 666
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 2 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD25, 0 if BRD<25).
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of country unit. The sample includes
African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002
to 2014 due to the lag structure. Both regressions include year and country fixed effects as
well as time trends. Time Trends include a linear country-specific time trend. Column (1)
refer to all regions without members of the governing coalition, whereas column (2) to regions
that contain groups exclusively from the coalition and column (3) to mixed regions with some
groups in and out of the coalition.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
For China, there are no signs of any conflict-inducing spill-over effects. For the WB, aid dis-
bursements in coalition regions as well as to non-coalition regions strongly and significantly reduce
conflict in the same respective regions, conditional on aid to the other parts of the country. For
mixed, and, hence, more likely contested regions, the coefficient is close to 0 and insignificant.
This is in line with the prior results, and mostly similar to the results for China.
Still, there is also some evidence of positive spill-overs for the WB. More aid to non-coalition
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and to mixed regions increases the likelihood of violent conflict in coalition regions. This effect is
considerably large in size. 10% more WB aid to non-coalition regions increases the likelihood of
conflict with at least five casualties by 4 percentage points. 10% more aid to mixed regions even
by 6.5%.32 This would be in line with a strengthening of non-government groups, which increases
their capacity and willingness to engage. Of course, causality is even harder to establish in such
a setting.
5.7 Sensitivity
We conduct various sensitivity tests, which we describe in short here grouped by issue. All ac-
companying tables and figures can be found in the Online Appendix.
Modifiable area unit problem - different aggregation levels: We show results both at a more
aggregated and a less aggregated level. First, we aggregate at the country level. This allows us
to see whether our prior analyses of spill-overs hide important patterns that we might see in the
aggregation, and makes our results comparable to studies at the country level. We show results
with the WB and China in the same regression, with and without controlling for aid projects that
could not be assigned to a particular region. This is to a large extent projects where money flows
directly to the central government. Coefficients are in both specifications and for both donors neg-
ative. When controlling for non-geocoded aid the coefficient for WB aid becomes more negative,
though insignificant, while the coefficient for China remains virtually unchanged. Thus, our results
at the local level do not seem to be driven by choosing a particular spatial unit.33
In Table A43 (A42), we move towards OLS (IV) regressions at a lower level of aggregation,
the ADM2 level. Note that we are capturing a smaller share of all projects at this level due to the
precision level in the georeferencing. The OLS results for the WB and China are both similar to the
ones at the ADM1 level, with the majority of coefficients being negative. The patterns of statistical
significance are also similar with OLS; five out of nine coefficients are significantly negative for
the WB, and none for China. The IV point estimates differ somehow, but never turn statistically
significant.
Choice of conflict indicator: As we discuss in the data section, there is no "correct" coding of
the dependent variable, just more and less plausible choices. Table A35 (A36) presents alternative
regression results with a higher conflict threshold of at least 25 BRD per region year using the OLS
(IV) specifications. Table A33 (Table A34) considers the log of battle-related deaths (+0.01) as a
continuous measure of conflict intensity instead of looking at a binary indicator of conflict incidence
32 Table A44 runs a similar analysis, but instead of regions that according to EPR are part of the governing coalition, it
focuses on capital vs. other regions.
33 Point estimates for the less precisely coded aid can be found in Table A45. Although the coefficient for non-geocoded
WB aid is positive it remains insignificant, suggesting also a null effect at the country level.
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using OLS (IV). We find largely negative OLS coefficients for the WB and slightly positive ones for
China, but with IV both coefficients turn negative in line with prior results.
Table 10: Aggregate - Cross-country Analysis - OLS
(1) (2)
ln(WBAid t-1) -0.2035 -0.3419
(0.2492) (0.4410)




Non-geocoded aid as control: No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 2 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥25,
0 if BRD<25). Estimates refer to the country level, where aid and battle-related
deaths were aggregated at the country level. Columns (1) and (2) depict coefficient
for geocoded aid aggregated at the country level. Column (2) controls for non-
geocoded aid, which is aid coded less precise than the ADM1 level (refer to Figure
2). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB
from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure.
All regressions include year and country fixed effects as well as time trends. Re-
gressions include country and year fixed effects as well as a linear county-trend.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the country. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Instrumental variable: We conduct the majority of robustness tests regarding our IV strategy.
As outlined above, we detrended the Chinese steel production time series because it is dominated
by a long-term trend, but not the WB liquidity where there is enough year-to-year variation.34 Table
23 shows that our first stages also work when using the detrended IDA position or the unadjusted
Chinese steel excess production. This suggests that the long-term trends in steel production do
not overlap with a problematic trend in conflict that differs between low and high probability regions.
The second component of the IV, the probability term, can also be computed in different ways.
We test various plausible options. Using the cumulative probability is advantageous as it only
uses pre-determined values, but could create problems if the probability in the first year(s) is not
as informative. Table A22 drops the first year of the respective panel (start at 1998 for the WB’s
IDA and 2003 for Chinese Steel), so that the first probability is already based on at least two
observations. Table A24 uses a constant probability from the third year of the respective sample
onwards, i.e., 1998 for the WB’s IDA, and 2003 for Chinese Steel, as in Nunn and Qian (2014).
Table A21 drops the 10 highest leverage region-year observations. The IV is robust to all these
choices and specifications.
Moreover, Table A18 reports reduced form estimates. Table A19 uses a lead of aid as a
placebo treatment in the first stage, which always shows up statistically insignificantly. Table 17
34 Although we control in later specifications for linear trends on the country and regional level, we would not capture
the variation incorporated in the interaction of a linear trend with the time-varying exposure term.
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reports the first stage including the coefficient for the probability.
Non-linear estimators: In line with Berman et al. (2017), we also run a Poisson Pseudo Maxi-
mum Likelihood estimation in Table 46, which is suitable for binary outcomes with a large fraction
of zeros. The results are generally in line with the main findings in terms of coefficient signs.
However, note that the models converge only when restricting us to the use of year fixed effects.
Temporal dependence: As conflict might be highly persistent over time, we include a lagged
dependent variable in Table 53. The results are very similar, with mostly negative and partly
significant coefficients for the WB and China.
Overlapping panels: Our main tables use the years 1995-2012 for the WB, and the years 2000-
2012 for China. As there could be coordination or competition between the two donors (e.g.,
Gehring et al., 2015; Humphrey and Michaelowa, 2018), we also want to estimate both jointly
in one regression. Tables A55 and A56 show that the coefficients change slightly, with the WB
estimates becoming less negative on average. This change seems to be nearly entirely explained
by periodical differences in the effect of WB aid. When re-estimating the WB results for the years
2000-2012 in Tables A54 and A52, the point estimates are nearly the same without conditioning
on Chinese Aid. Hence, not controlling directly for the other donor does not seem to create a
large bias, it seems rather that the effects differ between different observation periods. As limiting
the WB period creates a weak IV problem with country-year FE (see Table A52), we choose our
two main specifications with differing sample periods in order to exploit the maximum available
information for each donor.
6 Conclusion
Our paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between development aid
and conflict at the subnational level. The contribution of our paper is to bridge the gap between ex-
isting studies using various countries at the aggregated country level (Bluhm et al., 2016; Nielsen
et al., 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2014), and studies focusing on specific types of aid or individual
countries (Berman et al., 2011; Child, 2018; Crost et al., 2014). To achieve that aim, we examine
two donors that represent two contrasting approaches to development, the WB and China. One
is a multilateral donor that emphasizes human right conditions and expert knowledge, the other
an emerging South-South donor that emphasizes "mutual benefits" without many official strings
attached (Asmus et al., 2017).
Our results on aid and conflict in the same region show no signs of a conflict-fueling effect on
average. Rather, aid seems to be able to somehow reduce the likelihood of conflict in particular
for WB projects. When distinguishing between different sectors, we find the strongest and most
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significant conflict-reducing effects for projects in the transport sector (both donors). Distinguishing
different conflict types suggests that the reduction in conflict is driven by less lethal violence by
governments against civilians.
We examine claims that in particular Chinese projects lead to civilian unrest in Africa by ignor-
ing local traditions and circumstances, or replacing people. For none of the two donors, we find
evidence that demonstrations, strikes, or riots increase significantly. When focusing on non-lethal
repression by recipient governments, however, we find consistent evidence that regions in which
China is engaged show an increased likelihood of repressive measures. The precise reasons for
this should be explored in future research. It seems in line with a rationale where China is eager
to avoid violent conflict that endangers its workers and investment, but less opposed to repression
than the Western donors.
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A.1 Independent Variables (Development Aid)
WB’s IDA & IBRD disbursements
For our analysis, we draw on the "WB IBRD-IDA, Level 1, Version 1.4.1" provided by the AidData
consortium, which covers approved loans under the IBRD-IDA lending line between 1995 and
2014.35 These data correspond to project aid disbursed from 5684 projects in 61,243 locations.
The data build on information provided by the WB, including the disbursement dates, project sec-
tors and disbursed values. These values were deflated to 2011 values. In an effort to allow for
more fine-grained analysis of aid projects, AidData’s coders filtered the location names from aid
project documentation and assigned these to specific locations. While for some projects exact
locations including latitude and longitude were assigned, other projects, which had a more policy
or regulation oriented purpose, could only be assigned to an administrative level (e.g., the first
35 As the number of documented projects declines steeply after 2012, we focus on the 1995-2012 period.
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level of subnational regions (provinces) or the second level (districts)). In order to include as many
disbursements as possible, but to be also able to grasp the advantages of georeferenced data, we
focus our analysis on these administrative levels. For our administrative boundaries, we build on
the GADM dataset constructed by Hijmans et al. (2012). One difficulty with these data is that for
some countries, including more populous nations like Armenia, more fine-grained administrative
distinctions are missing. As the size of administrative regions is not fixed by size across countries,
we assume in this cases that our ADM1 regions would be ADM2 regions.
Figure 6 displays the development finance locations coded by donor, distinguishing all projects
(precision 1-8), projects coded at least at the first administrative level (precision 1-4), projects
coded at least at the second administrative level (precision 1-3) and projects coded more precise
(precision 1-2).
(a)
Figure 6: No. of Project Locations by Precision Codes
One challenge arises in projects with a multitude of locations, where it is not possible to derive
a distinct value of disbursements. In this regard, we suggest two solutions.
First, we allocate disbursements by the number of locations. In line with previous research
by Dreher and Lohmann (2015) we assume that aid is distributed equally across locations and
allocate aid proportionally to the locations per region. For instance, for a project with 10 locations,
where 4 locations are in region A and 6 locations are in region B, 40% of project disbursements
would be accounted in region A and 60% in region B.
Second, we calculate population weighted disbursements. Here, we assume that aid is al-
located based on the regional population shares. For instance, if a project would have project
locations in two regions of a country, where two million inhabitants would reside in region A and
three million would reside in region B, 40% of project disbursements would be accounted in re-
gion A and 60% in region B. Here, the aid attribution formula would write as follows: Aidpijt =
Aidpit´
Populationpi
∗ Populationpj , where p is the project, i is the country, j is the region and t is the
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period for which we estimate the allocation shares.
Finally, our dataset comprises development finance from IBRD and IDA. However, only IDA
disbursements can be classified as Official Development Assistance. For this purpose, disburse-
ments were disentangled into IDA (development aid) and IBRD (development finance) disburse-
ments.
Allocation scheme (more detailed)
Location weighting
The WB geocoded data release comes in the format of projects and several corresponding loca-
tions. For instance, a typical project report would mention the transaction amounts, the project
purpose as well as different project locations. The latter can be classified in different degrees
of precision (e.g., precision codes smaller than 4 correspond to locations that refer to an ADM2
region or even more precise, while precision code 4 corresponds to locations at the ADM1 level).
When allocating the development aid across locations on the ADM1 and ADM2 level, we make
the following assumptions based on a three-step procedure.36 First, we subtract the share of de-
velopment aid, which corresponds to locations, which are coded less precise than ADM1 (e.g.,
large geographic regions or aid at the country level). For example, if three out of 10 locations in a
project are coded less precise than ADM1, the further analysis focuses on the remaining 70% of
development aid. Second, we then allocate all aid with precision codes 1-3 to the corresponding
ADM2 regions. This is done by taking the location share (either by equal or population weights)
of the transaction amount per location. A certain ADM2 regions might have several locations per
project or even several projects, we collapse our data by ADM2 region. Third, we then allocate all
aid with precision code 4 to the corresponding ADM1 regions. This is done by taking the location
share (either by equal or population weights) of the transaction amount per location. A certain
ADM1 regions might have several locations per project or even several projects, we collapse our
data by ADM1 region. In order to allow for inference on the ADM2 level, we make the assumption
that transactions coded with precision 4 are attributable equally to all corresponding ADM2 re-
gions. In practice, this is done by merging the ADM1 regions with all corresponding ADM2 regions
and then splitting the aid with location or population weights. Finally, data with precision codes 1-3
and precision code 4 can be simply added upon the ADM2 level yielding our treatment variable
of interest. For inference on the ADM1 level, totals of ADM2 level development assistance are
created on the geounit-year level.














Table 11: Aid Allocation Formula Example
Example of Weighted Aid Allocation
Proj. ID Year Aid Val. Loc. ID ADM1 ID ADM2 ID Prec. Code ADM1 Weight Prec. 4 Aid Prec. 1–3 Total Aid
to ADM2
1995 100 2 1 1 1 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 3 1 2 2 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 4 2 1 4 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 5 3 1 3 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 6 3 2 1 1/7 14.29 14.29
1 1995 100 6 3 3 4 (1/7)*(1/3) 4.76 4.76
1 1995 100 6 3 1 4 (1/7)*(1/3) 4.76 4.76
1 1995 100 7 3 2 4 (1/7)*(1/3) 4.76 4.76
1 1995 100 8 4 1 4 1/7 14.29 14.29
Totals: 42.86 57.14 100.00
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Population weighting
Analogous to the location weighted aid, we also distribute aid with population weights. Our pop-
ulation data are from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)
Columbia University (2016). However, some projects only consist of locations without population
estimates (e.g., deserts). In this case, we assume a population of one citizen per location in order
to be able to distribute those aid disbursements. We then consequently attribute population of
ADM1 regions to project locations, which are coded at the ADM1 level (precision 4), and ADM2
populations to project locations, which are coded at least as precise as the ADM2 level (precision
1-3).
Similar to the location-weighing, we construct the total population of each project-year popproject.
For the projects coded with precision 4, we then attribute disbursements via the regional share in
population popADM1. This is then divided by popproject and multiplied with the project disburse-
ments TransactionV alueproj in each year: ADM1Precision4 = popADM1popproj ∗ TransactionV alueproj .
As there might be several active projects per ADM1 region, we aggregate the disbursements on
the ADM1 level. In order to break those numbers down to the ADM2 level, we merge all corre-
sponding ADM2 regions to the ADM1 regions. We then divide the population in each ADM2 region
by the population in each ADM1 region and multiply this share with the yearly disbursements per
region, ADM2Precision4 = popADM2popADM1 ∗ ADM1Precision4. For the precision codes 1-3 (at least
coded as precise as the ADM2 level), we then attribute disbursements via the regional share in
population divided by popproject. This is then multiplied with the project disbursements in each
year: ADM2Precision123 = popADM2popproj ∗ TransactionV alueproj . As there might be several active
projects per ADM2 region, we aggregate the disbursements on the ADM2 level. Finally, we merge
the precision code 1-3 and 4 data on the ADM2 level to obtain our variables of interest. Those can
then be aggregated on the ADM1 level.
Chinese Aid (ODA-like and OOF flows)
In order to create our data on the ADM2 and ADM1 level, we make use of the feature that aid
can be defined on the ADM2 level and then aggregated to the ADM1 level. One challenge with
the data is, however, that we lack information on the ADM2 regions for some countries (as there
are no ADM2 regions in small countries). Therefore, we create two spatial joins of ADM1 and
ADM2 regions from the GADM dataset with Chinese aid point features. This yields matches of the
specific project locations with the administrative regions as depicted in Figure 7.
In order to create our data, we first load our ADM2 data into Stata and drop the ADM0 and
ADM1 identifiers in order to be later able to rely on the identifiers from the ADM1-Aid spatial join.
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Notes: Graphical depiction based on Quantum GIS.
Figure 7: Chinese Aid ADM1 Spatial Join
The next step involves merging the ADM2-Aid spatial join with the ADM1-Aid spatial join by the
target-fid, which uniquely identifies the points from the Dataset ”aiddata_china_1_1_1.xlsx” by
Dreher et al. (2016) and Strange et al. (2017). Based on this data, we create unique identifiers
for all ADM1 and ADM2 regions, whereby we treat ADM1 regions as ADM2 regions in cases that
ADM2 regions are missing (e.g., in Cape Verde). This assumption can be made as sizes of ad-
ministrative regions are rather arbitrary and several ADM2 regions are larger than other countries’
ADM1 regions. After getting the regional identifiers right, we can merge (a) the spatial joins of
ADM regions & Chinese aid locations with (b) data on flows of Chinese aid. In a first step, we
clean these data from entries that only relate to pledges of Chinese aid (information is from the
variable status254). Although the data on Chinese finance to Africa also contain information on
official investment, the focus of this paper is on development aid. Thus, we focus on flows, which
correspond to ”ODA-like” funds as those would correspond closest to development aid (following
individual correspondence with the authors of Strange et al. (2017)). The data are then merged
with population data from the gridded population of the world data in order to be able to allocate
financial flows with population weights in case one project had commitment locations in different
administrative regions. Yet, one further challenge has to be resolved before allocating the commit-
ments to regions, as the Chinese aid commitments are coded like WB disbursements with different
precision (e.g., some are coded only for geographic features, which involve several administrative
regions or are funds which go to central ministries or the government). For our commitment allo-
cation, we only consider those projects, which are at least coded at the ADM1 level. This means
that we proportionally exclude commitments, which provide information on the central level and
on sub-regional level as indicated before. We furthermore distinguish between projects, which
are coded only at the ADM1 level and ones that provide information on the ADM2 level (or more
precise). The former are proportionally split over the underlying ADM2 regions. Although the latter
A DATA APPENDIX 7
can be precisely traced back to the ADM2 region, it might happen that projects have commitments
in several ADM2 regions. In this case, we also split the commitments proportionally by locations
or population as indicated earlier.
To exploit sectoral variation in development finance both for the WB and China, we make use
of the information provided by Strange et al. (2017) on Chinese aid’s sectoral allocation using
the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) codes. To achieve comparability with the broad
sectors indicated for the WB, we assign sectors as follows: "Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry"
(CRS-310:"Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing"), "Public Administration, Law and Justice" (CRS-
150), "Information and communication” (CRS-220: "Communications"), “Education” (CRS-110:
"Education"), “Finance” (CRS-240: "Banking and Financial Services"), "Health and other social
services" (CRS-120: "Health," CRS-160: "Other Social infrastructure and services"), "Energy and
mining" (CRS-230: "Energy Generation and Supply"), "Transportation" (CRS-210: "Transport and
Storage"), "Water, sanitation and flood protection" (CRS-140: "Water Supply and Sanitation"),
"Industry and Trade" (CRS-330: "Trade and Tourism," CRS-320: "Industry, Mining, Construction").
Sectoral distribution of aid disbursements
We use additional information on the financier for each disbursement for each project. Based
on this information, we can construct sectoral distributions of aid flows. While both donors are
investing heavily in transportation across Africa, further priorities differ. The WB supports Health
and Social Services strongly, whereas China commits a large share of its funds to Industry &
Trade.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Sectoral Distribution of Aid: (a) WB’s IDA; (b) China
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A.2 Dependent Variables (Conflict data)
As AidData and UCDP use the same coding framework, we can make use of similar coding rules
and use likewise only observations, which are coded at least at the ADM1 level (precision codes
1-4).
Again for the more precise data (precision codes 1 and 2), we use a point to polygon analysis
on the ADM level. As one conflict event is always coded in one discernible location (UCDP, 2015),
we do not need to make additional distributional assumptions by location number or population
size for conflict data, because we do not face issues of multiple project locations, which we had
in the aid data. Yet, for conflict observations on the ADM1 level (precision code 4), we do not
distribute battle-related deaths by population weights across ADM2 regions.
One further useful feature of the UCDP data is that it is possible to discern three different types
of violence. Those are namely the government against organized groups (type 1), organized non-
governmental groups versus the government (or against another non-governmental group) (type
2), and one-sided violence by the government against civilians (type 3 governmental) and by non-
governmental groups against civilians (type 3 non-governmental).37
UCDP data can be considered as comprehensive for our 1995 to 2012 sample, despite for
Syria for which no battle-related deaths information are provided. Hence, all missing values are
treated as zeros except for the Syrian case, which is not part of our analysis.
SCAD data
UCDP data focus on organized violence with lethal outcomes. However, along with the different
theories, it could be hypothesized that discontent and aid appropriation do not necessarily need
to be linked to full-fledged conflict. What is more, recent empirical work by Bluhm et al. (2016)
underscores the role of aid in conflict dynamics. Thus, we also consider social conflict as a fur-
ther outcome, in terms of demonstrations and repressions, based on the Social Conflict Analysis
Database (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2013). SCAD involves demonstrations, riots, strikes, coups,
pro-, anti- and extra-government violence, which can, but do not necessarily have to involve casu-
alties. In this way, SCAD complements the UCDP data.38 SCAD mainly builds on data compiled
by the Lexis-Nexis services from searches of Agence France Presse and Associated Press (Lexis
Nexis, 2018). Based on the available information, data are georeferenced by web searches of the
locations mentioned in the event reports. Analogous to UCDP data, precision codes are provided,
which are used to allocate events in a similar manner.
37 For a more detailed decription of the different types of violence, please consult Croicu and Sundberg (2015).
38 Prior to 2014 armed conflict was not included in SCAD data and is now also distinguished from ”social disturbances”
(Salehyan and Hendrix, 2017).
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Figure 9: WB Aid and Conflict - By Year
Figure 10: Chinese Aid and Conflict - By Year
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Figure 11: SCAD Data for precision codes 1-4
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A.3 Sources
Table 13 lists descriptions and sources of our independent, dependent and control variables.
Matching EPR to GREG
To measure ethnic homelands, we use the GREG dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010), which is
a georeferenced version of the initial locations of ethnic homelands based on the Soviet Atlas
Narodov Mira. The information about the power status comes from the time-variant Ethnic Power
Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). Wherever possible, we match the group power status
from EPR in a particular year to one of the time-invariant GREG group homelands. The original
dataset assigns eight different power statuses to groups. The differences are sometimes marginal
and hard to interpret, which is why to minimize measurement error we only use the more precise
information on whether a group was part of the governing coalition or not. We then intersect
the ethnic group polygons with the administrative regions to classify regions as one of the three
categories.
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Variable Name Variable Description Time Period Variable Source
WB Aid log of WB Aid disbursements in
a given region-year
1995-2012 Strandow et al. (2011)
Chinese Aid log of Chinese Aid commitments
in a given region-year
2000-2012 Dreher et al. (2017)
Strikes, Riots,
Demonstrations
Binary indicator (100;0) if any
violent event of this type in a
given region-year took place
1995-2012 Salehyan et al. (2012)
Intensity 1/2 Binary indicator (100;0) if
>=5/>=25 persons were killed in
a given region-year
1995-2014 Croicu and Sundberg
(2016)





SPI value of drought severity of
the region’s entire rainy season




SPI value of drought severity
during the first month of the
region’s rainy season
1995-2014 Tollefsen et al. (2012)
and Guttman (1999)
Temperature Mean temperature (in degrees
Celsius) per region-year
1995-2014 Tollefsen et al. (2012)
and Fan and Van den
Dool (2008)
Precipitation Total amount of precipitation (in
millimeter) per region-year
1995-2014 Tollefsen et al. (2012)
and Schneider et al.
(2015)







“Bank‘s net investment portfolio
and its non-negotiable,
non-interest-bearing demand
obligations (on account of
members‘ subscriptions and
contributions)” divided ”by the




1995-2012 Dreher et al. (2017)
Elevation Standard deviation of regional
elevation as an indicator of
ruggedness of terrain





Binary indicator of presence of
rivers, lakes or ocean in a given
ADM1 region
Constant Natural Earth, available
at Natural Earth.com
Landarea Area of a given region Constant Hijmans et al. (2010)
Travel Time
(Mean)
Gives the mean regional
estimate of the travel time to the
nearest major city
Constant Tollefsen et al. (2012)
and Uchida and Nelson
(2009)
Borders Binary indicator if a given ADM1
region borders another country
Constant Own estimations based
on Hijmans et al.
(2010)
Table 13: Data Sources
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B Analytical Appendix
B.1 Instrumental Variable
B.1.1 Motivation of Instrumental Variable
Notes: Yearly values of IDA− Positiont based on Dreher et al. (2017).
Figure 12: IDA Position
(a) (b)
Figure 13: (a) WB IDA funding position and mean of ln(WB Aid) and (b) Deviations from trend in
steel production and mean of ln(Chinese Aid).
Note: Figure 13 a) displays the IDA funding position (thick line), the mean of logged WB aid disbursements per low
probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean of logged WB aid disbursements per high probability recipient
regions (dashed line). Figure 13 b) displays the log of the detrended Chinese Steel Production (thick line), the
mean of logged Chinese aid per low probability recipient regions (thin line) and the mean of logged Chinese aid
per high probability recipient regions (dashed line).
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Table 14: ADM1 - Leads and further Lags
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Two Leads and Lags: World Bank
ln(World Bank Aid t+1) -0.0059 0.1559
(0.1298) (0.1199)
ln(World Bank Aid t) -0.1089 -0.2128∗
(0.1152) (0.1157)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0214 -0.0933
(0.0973) (0.0956)
ln(World Bank Aid t-2) 0.0516 0.1424
(0.0939) (0.1212)
ln(World Bank Aid t-3) -0.0811 -0.0535
(0.0877) (0.1076)
N 10150 10150
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Lead and Lag: China
ln(Chinese Aid t+1) 0.1681 0.2083∗
(0.1244) (0.1258)
ln(Chinese Aid t) -0.0127 0.0231
(0.1268) (0.1358)
ln(Chinese Aid t-1) -0.0086 -0.0481
(0.1514) (0.1600)
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.0121 -0.0506
(0.1165) (0.1313)
ln(Chinese Aid t-3) 0.0572 -0.0308
(0.0986) (0.1102)
N 6525 6525
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country- × Year No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clus-
tered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes
African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and
2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from
1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag
structure. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well
as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific
time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 15: ADM1 IV (First Stage - Extensive Margin)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV FS Extensive Margin: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 4.0782∗∗∗ 4.8249∗∗∗
(0.4140) (0.5238)
Cum. Prob t-2 -4.3155∗∗∗ -5.0339∗∗∗
(0.4512) (0.5506)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV FS Extensive Margin: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -3.7025∗∗∗ -3.1905∗∗∗
(0.7694) (0.7572)
Cum. Prob t-3 -1.7443∗∗∗ -1.5365∗∗∗
(0.2117) (0.1989)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the IV regres-
sion, when instead of the aid amount a binary indicator of aid receipts is used.
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and
region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in
the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 16: ADM1 IV (First Stage - Intensive Margin)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV FS Intensive Margin: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 4.4155 8.5243∗∗
(3.3348) (3.7926)
Cum. Prob t-2 -2.3430 -6.3455
(3.8685) (4.3700)
N 7091 7081
Country-Year FE No Yes
Regional Time Trend Yes Yes
Country Time Trend: Yes Yes
CountryT imeTrend2: Yes Yes
Panel B: Chinese Aid: IV FS Intensive Margin: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -4.6878 -3.2045
(13.5122) (18.1847)
Cum. Prob t-3 -2.7933 -6.1660∗
(5.5180) (3.4017)
N 232 232
Country-Time Trends No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the IV regression, when constraining the
sample only on recipient regions. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB
and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. All regressions include exogenous controls, region fixed effects and year
fixed effects. Country-Year fixed effects and more rigid time trends are not included for Chinese Aid due to
the more limited variation. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 17: ADM1 IV (First Stage with probability constituent term)
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
Cum. Prob t-2 -72.7723∗∗∗ -82.0994∗∗∗
(7.7291) (9.2698)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8763∗∗∗ -60.6567∗∗∗
(14.9526) (14.9524)
Cum. Prob t-3 -33.3092∗∗∗ -29.6850∗∗∗
(3.9348) (3.7560)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients the first stage of the IV regres-
sion, displaying additionally the constituent term of the probability, which was also
used in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-
year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling
period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include
linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the prob-
ability is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 18: ADM1 Reduced Form
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Reduced Form: IDA Position
Cum. Prob t-2 10.8281 19.2994
(27.3795) (33.4583)
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 -7.1921 -18.2132
(26.5498) (33.5818)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Reduced Form: Chinese Steel
Cum. Prob t-3 -12.0548 -17.4914∗
(9.1057) (9.5552)
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 47.2461 39.7102
(47.4192) (51.6767)
N 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at
the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries
for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.1.2 Robustness of Instrumental Variable
Table 19: ADM1 - Placebo Instrumented Lead of Aid
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
Placebo (Lead): World Bank
ln(World Bank Aid t+1) 0.2299 0.2332
(0.3586) (0.3704)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.481 86.444
Panel B: Chinese Aid
Placebo (Lead): China
ln(Chinese Aid t+1) -0.1709 -0.8099
(0.4393) (0.5778)
N 8700 8700
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 17.628 12.910
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country × Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and re-
gional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region
fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-
specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 20: ADM1 IV (IDA-Positiont−1)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: IDA Position (t-1)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1294 -0.0251
(0.3976) (0.3868)
IV FS: IDA Position (t-1)
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 51.3655∗∗∗ 65.1984∗∗∗
(5.6627) (6.9103)
Cum. Prob t-2 -52.8484∗∗∗ -67.1407∗∗∗
(6.2620) (7.5204)
N 12325 12325
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5,
0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-
year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling
period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include
linear and squared country-specific time trends. Instead of a running sum of IDA
funding position in ”t” and ”t-1” only the variation in ”t-1” is used. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 21: ADM1 IV (Without high leverage region)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.0990 -0.2268
(0.3761) (0.4197)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.363 86.752
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 70.8414∗∗∗ 80.8936∗∗∗
(7.1068) (8.6851)
N 12317 12291
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.4529 -0.4367
(0.6166) (0.8058)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.462 16.449
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8804∗∗∗ -60.6611∗∗∗
(14.9554) (14.9568)
N 7974 7974
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 22: ADM1 IV (Without first year )
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.2904 -0.2681
(0.4172) (0.3975)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 80.438 78.004
IV First stage: IDA Position IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 68.5810∗∗∗ 88.1297∗∗∗
(7.6467) (9.9784)
N 11600 11600
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.9072 -0.9387
(0.9329) (1.2510)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.002 0.012
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 9.548 6.144
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -52.0807∗∗∗ -42.3054∗∗
(16.8548) (17.0681)
N 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard
errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African
countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions
include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-
specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The constituent term of the probability is depicted
in the appendix.
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Table 23: ADM1 IV (WB detrend & Chinese aid no detrend)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.3239 0.0770
(0.7185) (0.7595)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 30.474 15.646
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position detrend t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 49.1363∗∗∗ 59.7776∗∗∗
(8.9010) (15.1125)
Cum. Prob t-2 1.0001 0.3355
(1.5130) (1.8596)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0980 0.0374
(0.2384) (0.2766)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 66.567 58.408
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -54.7934∗∗∗ -50.5179∗∗∗
(6.7158) (6.6102)
Cum. Prob t-3 634.3188∗∗∗ 585.1439∗∗∗
(80.2897) (79.2510)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term
of the probability is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 24: ADM1 IV (Initial Probability)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.2253 -0.3389
(0.7469) (0.6205)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 27.151 26.086
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob 98 43.4309∗∗∗ 61.1537∗∗∗
(8.3349) (11.9734)
N 11600 11600
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -1.6319 -1.4597
(1.3706) (1.4889)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.001 0.004
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 10.461 7.880
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob 03 -36.7317∗∗∗ -35.9689∗∗∗
(11.3566) (12.8131)
N 7250 7250
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The probability is
based on the third year in the corresponding sample (1998 for the WB’s IDA; 2003 for Chinese

















B.2 Alternative Outcome Variables
Table 25: ADM1 - Actors (clustering at country-year and regional level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: WB Aid - OLS
OLS: WB - Actors State vs N-State N-State vs N-State State vs Civilans N-State vs Civilians
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1229∗ -0.1365∗ -0.0348 -0.0784 -0.0596 -0.0372 -0.1040∗∗ -0.0979∗
(0.0650) (0.0707) (0.0492) (0.0679) (0.0452) (0.0430) (0.0521) (0.0578)
N 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050
Panel B: Chinese Aid - OLS
OLS: China - Actors State vs N-State N-State vs N-State State vs Civilans N-State vs Civilians
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0009 0.0122 -0.0162 0.0016 -0.0702 -0.0625 -0.0338 -0.0334
(0.0548) (0.0663) (0.0554) (0.0769) (0.0483) (0.0542) (0.0349) (0.0439)
N 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for
Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Exogenous
(time-varying) controls are included in all regressions. Time Trends included, consist of linear and squared country-specific time trends as well
as linear regional time trends. "State vs N-State" refers to state-based violence against non-government actors, "N-State vs N-State" refers to
non-government violence against the other organized non-state groups, and "State vs Civilians" refers to one-sided violence versus civilians by the
government and "N-State vs. Civilians" refers to one-sided violence versus civilians by non-government (NG) actors. The categories are mutually

















Table 26: ADM1 OLS results (Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD])
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.1194 0.1291 0.4360∗∗∗ 0.0106 -0.0140 -0.0035 -0.1421 -0.0092 -0.0447
(0.0912) (0.1028) (0.0885) (0.0641) (0.0751) (0.0848) (0.1063) (0.0954) (0.1133)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.8761∗∗∗ 1.0301∗∗∗ 1.0445∗∗∗ -0.1026 -0.0468 -0.0182 -0.0009 0.0141 0.0387
(0.2247) (0.1888) (0.1939) (0.0880) (0.1027) (0.1050) (0.1013) (0.1268) (0.1301)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for any violence of these three types as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for
Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 27: ADM1 IV (Riots, Demonstrations & Strikes [SCAD])
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.3854 -0.2032
(0.3092) (0.3362)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-1) 0.1578 0.2686
(0.6087) (0.7312)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8763∗∗∗ -60.6567∗∗∗
(14.9526) (14.9524)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for any violence of these three types as de-
pendent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for
the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects
as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The

















Table 28: ADM1 OLS results (Demonstrations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0578 0.1247∗ 0.3399∗∗∗ 0.0514 0.0414 0.0491 -0.0224 0.0390 0.0364
(0.0684) (0.0708) (0.0705) (0.0472) (0.0699) (0.0763) (0.0816) (0.0745) (0.0824)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.7830∗∗∗ 0.8995∗∗∗ 0.9203∗∗∗ -0.1090 -0.0865 -0.0781 -0.0704 -0.1094 -0.0888
(0.1899) (0.1649) (0.1700) (0.0766) (0.0919) (0.0985) (0.1011) (0.1233) (0.1236)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for demonstrations as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered
at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time

















Table 29: ADM1 OLS results (Riots)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0920 0.0037 0.2350∗∗∗ 0.0129 -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0831 -0.0853 -0.1080
(0.0620) (0.0856) (0.0617) (0.0533) (0.0559) (0.0617) (0.0682) (0.0804) (0.1049)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.4258∗∗∗ 0.5248∗∗∗ 0.5289∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0399 0.0316 0.0521 0.0424 0.0613
(0.1482) (0.1261) (0.1292) (0.0814) (0.0956) (0.0986) (0.0991) (0.1200) (0.1313)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for riots as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends

















Table 30: ADM1 OLS results (Strikes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0020 0.0302 0.1288∗∗∗ -0.0197 -0.0252 -0.0377 -0.0549 -0.0717 -0.0758
(0.0310) (0.0391) (0.0377) (0.0309) (0.0445) (0.0578) (0.0656) (0.0582) (0.0695)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.1611∗ 0.1832∗∗ 0.1931∗∗ -0.1785∗∗ -0.2042∗∗ -0.1845∗ -0.1800∗ -0.1620 -0.1605
(0.0847) (0.0810) (0.0846) (0.0712) (0.0887) (0.1043) (0.1036) (0.1073) (0.1122)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with a binary indicator for strikes as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends
include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 31: ADM1 IV (Repression (non-lethal) - Regions with UCDP Violence Against Civilians
coded as zero)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV: IDA Position - Actors
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.1543 0.0885
(0.1042) (0.1177)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV: Chinese Steel - Actors
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.9798∗∗∗ 1.3059∗∗∗
(0.3663) (0.5025)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a binary pro-governmental violence
indicator as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling
period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include
year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the ap-
pendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 32: Non-lethal pro-government Violence [SCAD] - Continuous measure
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0011 0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0013)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-1) 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0092)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for a continuous measure of non-lethal
pro-government violence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries
for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both
regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends
include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

















Table 33: ADM1 OLS results (Battle-related Deaths)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.0164∗ -0.0014 -0.0025 -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗ -0.0142∗ -0.0019 -0.0142∗ -0.0100
(0.0092) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0093)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0119 0.0034 0.0068 -0.0055 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 0.0034 0.0029
(0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0071)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with the log of battle-related deaths + 0.01 as dependent variable (category 3). Standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for
Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 34: ADM1 IV (Battle-Related Deaths)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.0179 -0.0340
(0.0340) (0.0358)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 99.639 86.724
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-1) -0.0413 -0.0270
(0.0470) (0.0635)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8763∗∗∗ -60.6567∗∗∗
(14.9526) (14.9524)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients for the log of battle-related deaths +0.01 as de-
pendent variable (category 3). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-
year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-
2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,

















Table 35: ADM1 OLS results (Intensity 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1061 -0.0440 -0.0703 -0.1810∗∗∗ -0.1522∗∗ -0.1528∗∗ -0.0544 -0.1386∗ -0.1453
(0.0659) (0.0551) (0.0536) (0.0528) (0.0669) (0.0668) (0.0747) (0.0764) (0.0927)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0917 -0.0209 0.0184 -0.0285 -0.0140 0.0059 -0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0099
(0.0614) (0.0504) (0.0378) (0.0446) (0.0530) (0.0496) (0.0543) (0.0568) (0.0645)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 2 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥25, 0 if BRD<25). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear
and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 36: ADM1 IV (Intensity 2)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second Stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1437 -0.4581
(0.3075) (0.3301)
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 70.9363∗∗∗ 80.8832∗∗∗
(7.1065) (8.6854)
N 12325 12325
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.1980 0.2563
(0.3729) (0.4669)
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8763∗∗∗ -60.6567∗∗∗
(14.9526) (14.9524)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 2 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥25, 0
if BRD<25). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period
of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include
year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear
and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability
is depicted in the appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.3 Channels - Ethnic groups and governing coalition
Conflicts are not only driven by economic considerations, but often strongly influenced by existing
cleavages between groups. Ethnic identities are the most salient traits and ethnic groups the most
important reference group in most African countries. To measure ethnic homelands, we use the
GREG dataset (Weidmann et al., 2010), which is a georeferenced version of the initial locations
of ethnic homelands based on the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira. These locations were determined
before our sample, and, even though immigration becomes more important over time, prior studies
suggest that a large share of Africans still live in their ethnic home region (Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011). This makes those group polygons a noisy, but still informative measure.
A first important question is whether the effect of aid projects differs between more and less
ethnically fractionalized regions. Theoretically, one might expect more potential for dissatisfaction
about an unequal allocation of projects or the distribution of the associated benefits in ethnically
fractionalized regions. We compute standard fractionalization measures in line with the literature
(Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), and split the sample between countries in re-
gions with fractionalization above or below the mean or median. Appendix Tables 38 and 39 show
no large differences. When including country-year FE, the negative relationship between aid and
conflict becomes even a bit stronger, but the difference is small. Even in the more fractionalized
regions, it does not turn positive. 39
More important than considering ethnic cleavages in general is to define which ethnic groups
are allies and form a joint coalition and which groups are outside that coalition. To classify admin-
istrative regions, our unit of analysis, we distinguish whether all groups (Coalition), at least one
group (Mixed), or no group (N-Coalition) in a region is part of the governing coalition in a particular
year. The information about the power status comes from the time-variant Ethnic Power Relations
(EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). Wherever possible, we match the group power status from EPR
in a particular year to one of the time-invarying GREG group homelands. The original dataset
assigns 8 different power statuses to groups. The difference are sometimes marginal and hard to
interpret, which is why we only use the more precise information on whether a group was part of
the governing coalition or not. We then intersect the ethnic group polygons with the administrative
regions to classify regions as one of the three categories.
This distinction aims at testing the plausibility of the existing results, and at uncovering hetero-
geneous effects that might be hidden in the averages. For instance, it might be that there is no
conflict-inducing effect on average. However, assuming that aid project benefit governing groups
more often, existing tensions and conflict might be fueled especially in mixed districts where other
39 Note that for individual aid types, the IV does not perform sufficiently well for China when splitting the samples.
Therefore, we show the OLS specifications for all the sample splits for China. We intend to conduct a more in-depth
analysis of aid inequality and ethnic groups in an accompanying paper.
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groups observe these distributional differences. In contrast, rapacity theory would predict that
governing coalition regions with large aid inflows become more attractive for rebels to capture.
We find several interesting differences in Table 37. The results for the WB always change
signs depending on the inclusion of country-year fixed effects. Nonetheless, there is again never a
significant conflict-inducing effect. For China, all coefficients are negative, even though again sta-
tistically insignificant. Even when considering governing coalition structures, on average Chinese
aid does not increase conflicts with at least 5 BRDs.40
40 This finding is robust to defining the coalition only as the more powerful senior, dominant or monopoly groups and
excluding junior partners. Results are available upon request from the authors. Appendix Table 40 presents the
coalition sample split without controlling for fractionalization. Appendix Table 41 shows the results in Table 37 for the

















Table 37: ADM1 results (Power status - Member of Coalition Group)
Panel A: WB - IV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict in region belonging to ... N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.7052 0.2016 0.0686 -0.6372 0.1552 -0.3712
(0.9362) (1.3680) (0.4500) (0.4716) (0.5181) (0.5339)
N 2144 2075 3750 3651 4569 4537
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 35.086 18.726 41.902 26.417 63.396 66.952
Panel B: China- OLS:
Conflict in region belonging to... N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.2049 -0.2949 -0.0675 -0.0331 -0.0057 -0.0197
(0.2185) (0.3223) (0.1328) (0.1455) (0.2442) (0.2647)
N 1466 1412 2698 2626 3220 3198
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control for Fractionalization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Both regressions include
(time-varying) exogenous controls, year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends as well as linear regional time trends. Columns (1) & (2) refer to all regions without members of the governing coalition, whereas columns (3) &
(4) to mixed regions with some groups in and out of the coalition, and columns (5) & (6) to regions that contain groups exclusively from the coalition. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.4 Ethnic Groups
Table 38: ADM1 results (Sample split - Mean of Fractionalization)
Panel A: WB Aid - IV:
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0492 -0.5546 -0.0498 -0.0256
(0.4419) (0.4796) (0.6270) (0.8597)
N 6715 6698 3757 3740
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 79.593 56.722 63.955 45.934
Panel B: Chinese Aid - OLS:
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0069 -0.0044 -0.0990 0.0527
(0.1222) (0.1434) (0.1845) (0.1641)
N 4740 4728 2652 2640
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample is split
in regions, which are below the country level mean of ethnic fractionalization (0) [columns (1) & (2)] or above the
mean (1) [columns (3) & (4)]. Ethnic fractionalization is based on 1−∑ s2, where s is the ethnic groups area share
in the administrative region. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional
level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for
Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to
the lag structure. Both regressions include (time-varying) exogenous cont+rols, year and region fixed effects as well
as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear regional time
trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 39: Sample-split: Median Fractionalization
Panel A: WB Aid - IV:
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.2585 -0.6189 0.1471 -0.0455
(0.4163) (0.4904) (0.5688) (0.7054)
N 5474 5474 4998 4998
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 71.721 49.454 75.067 65.391
Panel B: Chinese Aid - IV:
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.7075 -0.8209 0.0282 1.3653
(0.8256) (1.0744) (0.8463) (1.1783)
N 3542 3542 3234 3234
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 30.983 21.080 15.370 9.900
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample is split in
regions, which are below the country level median/mean of ethnic fractionalization (0) [columns (1) & (2)] or above
the median/mean (1) [columns (3) & (4)]. Ethnic fractionalization is based on 1−∑ s2, where s is the ethnic groups
area share in the administrative region. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to
2014 due to the lag structure. Both regressions include (time-varying) exogenous cont+rols, year and region fixed
effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as linear

















Table 40: ADM1 results (Power status - Coalition - Not Controlling for Fractionalization)
Panel A: Coalition groups
WB Aid:
N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.6275 0.1616 0.0568 -0.6527 0.1139 -0.4289
(0.9584) (1.4459) (0.4507) (0.4697) (0.5138) (0.5259)
N 2144 2075 3750 3651 4569 4537
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 34.890 18.952 41.411 26.677 63.691 67.559
Chinese Aid:
N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.7974 -7.7164 -1.1273 -1.6313∗ 1.0984 2.1281
(3.3008) (10.3143) (0.7450) (0.9361) (1.0069) (1.7389)
N 1335 1285 2487 2420 2944 2924
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.349 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.020
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 0.951 0.879 56.524 40.500 12.471 6.859
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control for Fractionalization No No No No No No
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Both regressions include
(time-varying) exogenous cont+rols, year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends as well as linear regional time trends. Columns (1) & (2) refer to all regions without members of the coalition, whereas columns (3) & (4) refer

















Table 41: ADM1 results (Power status - Coalition), corresponds to Table 37
Panel A: Coalition groups
WB Aid: OLS
World Bank: Conflict in region belonging to... N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1304 -0.1532 -0.0567 -0.2146 -0.1383 -0.1930
(0.2290) (0.2961) (0.1725) (0.1873) (0.1494) (0.2113)
N 2287 2215 3962 3860 4837 4804
Chinese Aid: IV
Conflict in region belonging to ... N-Coalition N-Coalition Coalition Coalition Mixed Mixed
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.4579 -7.2834 -1.1125 -1.6389∗ 1.0909 2.1283
(3.4111) (9.7063) (0.7415) (0.9371) (1.0101) (1.7629)
N 1335 1285 2487 2420 2944 2924
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.349 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.021
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 0.913 0.918 57.165 40.299 12.402 6.735
Country ×Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control for Fractionalization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the
country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Both regressions include
(time-varying) exogenous cont+rols, year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends as well as linear regional time trends. Columns (1) & (2) refer to all regions without members of the coalition, whereas columns (3) & (4) refer
to mixed regions with some groups in and out of coalition and columns (5) & (6) include exclusively groups with the coalition power stati. These are
the corresponding OLS and IV results to Table 37. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 43
B.5 Spatial Dimension (Aggregation Levels and Spill Overs)
Table 42: ADM2 IV (Intensity 1)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.2599 0.1522
(0.1644) (0.1171)
N 99367 99367
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0151 -0.0289
(0.1116) (0.1459)
N 64285 64285
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if
BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clus-
tered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes
African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB
and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and
region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear
and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the


















Table 43: ADM2 OLS results (Intensity 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0288 0.0188 0.0068 -0.0740∗∗∗ -0.0674∗∗∗ -0.0580∗∗ -0.0354 -0.0627∗∗ -0.0535∗
(0.0209) (0.0196) (0.0219) (0.0245) (0.0234) (0.0251) (0.0294) (0.0262) (0.0316)
N 105354 105354 105354 105354 105214 105214 91333 105214 91333
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 0.0105 0.0104 0.0579∗ -0.0392 -0.0499 -0.0410 -0.0455 -0.0501 -0.0500
(0.0407) (0.0402) (0.0331) (0.0318) (0.0392) (0.0327) (0.0347) (0.0449) (0.0446)
N 76089 76089 76089 76089 70132 70132 64482 70132 64482
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 45
Analyzing spill-overs between capital and non-capital regions has the advantage of not relying
on the EPR data and the ethnic homelands, and the disadvantage that it plots one region against
all others. We run two sets of regressions. In some, we use only the aid payments we included so
far, in the second set we assign all aid that could not be allocated to an ADM1 region to the capital
region. These specifications indicate no significant spill-overs between capital and other regions.




Conflict in other Region - World Bank Capital Non-Capital
ln(WB Aid non-cap t-1) -0.2524 -0.6459
(0.4017) (0.4376)
ln(WB Aid cap t-1) 0.3004 0.3525
(0.3901) (0.4779)
N 836 836
Conflict in other Region - China Capital Non-Capital
ln(Chinese Aid non-cap t-2) -0.1586 -0.0330
(0.1545) (0.1655)





Conflict in other Region - World Bank Capital Non-Capital
ln(WB Aid non-Capital t-1) -0.3725 -0.3694
(0.2928) (0.4252)
ln(WB Aid Capital t-1) 0.3953 -0.0802
(0.2417) (0.4529)
N 836 836
Conflict in other Region - China Capital Non-Capital
ln(Chinese Aid non-Capital t-2) -0.1047 0.0585
(0.1647) (0.1813)
ln(Chinese Aid Capital t-2) -0.2147∗ -0.1836
(0.1190) (0.1983)
N 792 792
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5,
0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of country.
The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012
for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the
WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag
structure. Both regressions include year and country fixed effects as well as
time trends. Time Trends include linearcountry-specific time trend. Column (1)
refers to aid and its effect in the capital regions, whereas column (2) refers to aid
and its effect in non-capital regions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 46
Table 45: Aggregate - Cross-country Analysis - OLS
Geocoded Non-Geocoded
ln(WBAid t-1) -0.3419 0.2110
(0.4410) (0.4843)




Non-geocoded aid as control: No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 2 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥25,
0 if BRD<25). Estimates refer to the country level, where aid and battle-related
deaths were aggregated at the country level. Columns (1) and (2) refer to one re-
gression. Column (1) depicts coefficient for geocoded aid aggregated at the country
level. Column (2) depicts coefficients for non-geocoded aid, which is aid coded less
precise than the ADM1 level (refer to Figure ??). The sample includes African coun-
tries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid
from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. The regression includes country and
year fixed effects as well as a linear county-trend. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of the country. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B.6 Estimations - Miscellaneous
Table 46: PPML
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: WB Aid
main
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.0005 0.0178 -0.0171
(0.0063) (0.0149) (0.0173)
N 6246 1476 7344
Panel B: Chinese Aid
main
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0128∗ 0.0023 -0.0328∗
(0.0076) (0.0131) (0.0189)
N 3783 962 4589
Notes: Dependent variables: In column (1) a binary conflict indicator
(100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5), in column (2) a binary indicator if any
event of non-lethal pro-government violence took place, in column (3)
a continuous measure of logged battle-related deaths. Standard er-
rors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level. The sample in-
cludes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the
WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. All regressions include year fixed

















Table 47: ADM1 - Aid Subtypes
WB Aid Subtypes - OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) 0.0293 -0.1873∗∗ 0.1229 0.0215 -0.0958 -0.1575∗∗ 0.0236 -0.1479∗∗ -0.0339 -0.1125
(0.0753) (0.0918) (0.1575) (0.0793) (0.0919) (0.0798) (0.0941) (0.0729) (0.0898) (0.0951)
Panel B: Country-Year FE
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.0617 -0.2672∗∗∗ 0.0048 -0.0209 -0.0912 -0.1667∗ -0.0317 -0.1137 0.0013 -0.2080∗
(0.0950) (0.1031) (0.1790) (0.1062) (0.1474) (0.0977) (0.1043) (0.1021) (0.1131) (0.1139)
N 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050 13050
Chinese Aid Subtypes - IV
Panel C: No Country-Year FE AX BX CX EX FX JX LX TX WX YX
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 29.9239 -5.9930 2.4455 9.4914 6.0147 -1.7181 -14.3933 -7.0558 37.6114
(49.5442) (5.4875) (5.5354) (40.3416) (15.7536) (3.0469) (34.3126) (24.8028) (88.4269)
Kleibergen-Paap underid. test p-value 0.609 0.213 0.631 0.733 0.664 0.346 0.661 0.730 0.673
Kleibergen-Paap weak id. F-statistic 0.244 2.105 0.204 0.094 0.157 0.939 0.187 0.104 0.207
Panel D: Country-Year FE
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) 31.3584 -6.4790 0.7303 12.3422 N.A. 2.2117 13.0243 -43.1764 -1.7639 93.8070
(52.2393) (7.5040) (0.8107) (44.3311) (N.A.) (4.4871) (49.4362) (412.3877) (9.2212) (894.9630)
N 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700 8700
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.605 0.260 0.191 0.685 – 0.446 0.734 0.912 0.460 0.911
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 0.274 1.472 1.949 0.135 – 0.476 0.107 0.011 0.492 0.012
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese
Aid. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Regressions account for (time-varying) exogenous controls and time trends. Time
Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends as well as a linear regional trend. AX - "Agriculture, fishing, and forestry" BX - "Public Administration, Law, and Justice" CX - "Information and
communications" EX - "Education" FX - "Finance" JX - "Health and other social services" LX - "Energy and mining" TX - "Transportation" WX - "Water, sanitation and flood protection" YX - "Industry and Trade"
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 48
Table 48: ADM1 IV (Clustering at Regional Level)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1014 -0.2252
(0.3276) (0.3899)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 237.269 132.466
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.4509 -0.4276
(0.6147) (0.8096)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 28.972 18.960
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level. The sample
includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as
time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The


















Table 49: ADM1 OLS results (Clustering at regional level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: WB Aid
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1918∗∗∗ 0.0010 -0.0496 -0.2129∗∗∗ -0.2057∗∗∗ -0.1608∗∗ -0.0419 -0.1772∗∗ -0.1420
(0.0709) (0.0643) (0.0666) (0.0611) (0.0624) (0.0672) (0.0775) (0.0799) (0.0906)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.1753∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0026 -0.1090∗∗ -0.0663 -0.0654 -0.0641 -0.0347 -0.0369
(0.0761) (0.0664) (0.0676) (0.0540) (0.0605) (0.0680) (0.0687) (0.0743) (0.0757)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country × Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The table displays regression coefficients with low Intensity Conflict (>5 battle-related deaths) as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Time Trends include linear and
squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 50
Table 50: ADM1 IV: Population Weighted Aid Allocation
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1026 -0.2286
(0.3798) (0.4256)
N 12325 12325
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 100.841 88.424
Panel B: Chinese Aid (1) (2)
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.4569 -0.4323
(0.6251) (0.8160)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.601 16.535
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if
BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-
2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include exogenous
(time-varying) controls. Year and region fixed effects as well as time trends are included
in all regressions. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends
and a linear regional trend. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the

















Table 51: OLS results: Population Weighted Aid Allocation
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1898∗ 0.0062 -0.0440 -0.2217∗∗∗ -0.2153∗∗∗ -0.1664∗∗ -0.0457 -0.1867∗∗ -0.1502
(0.1005) (0.0788) (0.0692) (0.0667) (0.0712) (0.0797) (0.0856) (0.0872) (0.1066)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.1776∗∗ -0.0246 -0.0037 -0.1137∗∗ -0.0718 -0.0696 -0.0679 -0.0390 -0.0408
(0.0865) (0.0704) (0.0648) (0.0576) (0.0789) (0.0833) (0.0881) (0.1021) (0.0919)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and
regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Conflicts are considered for the
WB from 1996 to 2013 and for Chinese aid from 2002 to 2014 due to the lag structure. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 52
Table 52: ADM1 IV (WB Aid - Same Years as Chinese Aid)
(1) (2)
Panel A: WB Aid
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.6227 -2.3417
(1.0568) (1.6897)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.005
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.619 6.960
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 57.2759∗∗∗ 63.9080∗∗∗
(12.0429) (24.2241)
N 7975 7975
Panel B: Chinese Aid
IV Second Stage: Chinese Steel
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.4509 -0.4276
(0.6168) (0.8068)
N 7975 7975
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 22.468 16.456
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.8763∗∗∗ -60.6567∗∗∗
(14.9526) (14.9524)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 2001-2012 for the WB and 2000-
2012 for Chinese Aid. Both regressions include year and region fixed effects as well as time
trends. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time trends. The constituent

















Table 53: OLS results: Lagged dependent variable
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.0844 -0.0069 -0.0173 -0.1659∗∗∗ -0.1575∗∗ -0.1406∗∗ -0.0350 -0.1647∗∗ -0.1355
(0.0520) (0.0551) (0.0458) (0.0585) (0.0618) (0.0707) (0.0812) (0.0808) (0.1025)
N 13104 13104 13104 13104 13050 13050 11017 13050 11017
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.0965∗ -0.0300 -0.0082 -0.0983∗ -0.0634 -0.0661 -0.0645 -0.0345 -0.0365
(0.0563) (0.0589) (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0771) (0.0871) (0.0921) (0.1029) (0.0913)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). This regression controls for the first lag of the binary indicator. Standard
errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 1995-2012 for the WB
and 2000-2012 for Chinese Aid. Applying the lag structure of our regression equation, this means that conflicts are considered for the WB from 1996 to 2013 and for

















Table 54: OLS results: (WB Aid - Same Years as Chinese Aid)
Panel A: WB Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1505 0.0559 0.0811 -0.0606 -0.0976 0.0657 0.0672 -0.0795 -0.0949
(0.1197) (0.0949) (0.0910) (0.0864) (0.0922) (0.0906) (0.0886) (0.0981) (0.0957)
N 8736 8736 8736 8736 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Panel B: Chinese Aid
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.1753∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0026 -0.1090∗ -0.0663 -0.0654 -0.0641 -0.0347 -0.0369
(0.0865) (0.0705) (0.0642) (0.0572) (0.0783) (0.0827) (0.0877) (0.1015) (0.0916)
N 9464 9464 9464 9464 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 2001-2012 for the WB. Conflicts are considered for the WB from 2002 to 2013

















Table 55: OLS results - Both Donors (Intensity 1)
WB & Chinese Aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.1460 0.0571 0.0808 -0.0603 -0.0973 0.0661 0.0674 -0.0793 -0.0948
(0.1194) (0.0951) (0.0913) (0.0864) (0.0926) (0.0904) (0.0889) (0.0979) (0.0958)
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.1278 -0.0291 0.0070 -0.1060∗ -0.0660 -0.0656 -0.0644 -0.0345 -0.0367
(0.0854) (0.0700) (0.0590) (0.0595) (0.0787) (0.0824) (0.0880) (0.1018) (0.0912)
N 8736 8736 8736 8736 8700 8700 8261 8700 8261
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Endogeneous Controls No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Country ×Year FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5). Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year
and regional level. The sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 2000-2012. Time Trends include linear and squared country-specific time
trends. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
B ANALYTICAL APPENDIX 56
Table 56: ADM1 IV - Both Donors (Intensity 1)
(1) (2)
IV Second stage: IDA Position
ln(World Bank Aid t-1) -0.7692 -2.4159
(1.0994) (1.7067)
ln(Chinese Aid t-2) -0.4485 -0.4033
(0.6271) (0.8310)
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test p-value 0.000 0.004
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-statistic 12.042 3.511
IV First stage: IDA Position
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 57.3141∗∗∗ 63.8098∗∗∗
(12.0387) (24.1928)
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -0.5590 -0.5283
(4.6845) (4.3082)
N 7975 7975
IV First stage: Chinese Steel
IDA Position t-1 ×Cum. Prob t-2 -18.0734∗ -9.5155
(9.3582) (12.7548)
Steel Prod detrend t-3 ×Cum. Prob t-3 -70.7017∗∗∗ -60.7419∗∗∗
(14.9511) (14.9668)
N 7975 7975
Exogeneous Controls Yes Yes
Exogeneous Controls×Year FE Yes Yes
Linear Regional Trends Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Category 1 binary conflict indicator (100 if BRD≥5, 0 if BRD<5).
Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered at the country-year and regional level. The
sample includes African countries for the sampling period of 2000-2012. Both regressions include
year and region fixed effects as well as time trends. Time Trends include linear and squared
country-specific time trends. The constituent term of the probability is depicted in the appendix.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
